Summary
A conformance leg that cannot fail passes every gate the corpus has. RFC 0148 stopped vacuous passes: a pass with no assertions, a soft-skip counted as a pass. It cannot catch a leg whose assertions are real but can never be false, such as a judge comparing a value with itself or a count that is zero on every host. This RFC makes the ability to fail a recorded fact. A new ledger records a red run for each cited requirement: what was broken, on which subject, under which suite. From RFC 0260, an RFC goes Accepted only when each id its Falsifiability table cites has such a row.
It also closes a hole in the predicate itself. Rule 4 of check-accepted-predicate.mjs checks the ids a Falsifiability table names, so a table that names none passes rule 4 with nothing to check. RFCs 0258 and 0259 were filed that way. From RFC 0258, every witnessable row names its id, or says it is planned.
Motivation
- Vacuous legs are found by reading, not by gates. Five RFC 0158 rows were vacuous or wrong, and every one was found by a host reading the scenario. Two examples: a durability leg that passed on an empty ledger (
0 <= 0), and an oracle that read the host's own ledger to witness exactly-once delivery. Each one passedreq()discipline, the RFC 0148 dispositions and the bundle signature. The only check that catches this class is to break the thing under test and watch the leg go red, and until now that was a habit, not a record. - The habit is uneven. Some scenarios list their sabotages in the docstring (
v2-colocated-companion), and most do not. Nothing ties a sabotage to the requirement id anAcceptedRFC cites, so a reader cannot tell which cited legs were ever shown able to fail. - Rule 4 can be vacuous. It iterates the ids in the table. The 2.46.44 filing of RFCs 0258 and 0259 used
§-labelled rows with no ids, and rule 4 would have passed theirAcceptedflips on any bundle.
Proposal
§A Requirement ids on every witnessable row
From RFC 0258, the Falsifiability table of an RFC whose Status is Active or Accepted MUST name at least one requirement id (openwop.requirement.NNNN.<slug>) on every row whose verdict is witnessable or seam-gated.
- A row with no leg yet MUST say
plannedin its verdict instead. - From RFC 0260, an RFC with a
plannedwitnessable row MUST NOT beAccepted: the row has no leg, so nothing witnessed it. - Rows whose verdict is
unwitnessable,claims-checkornegative-existenceare exempt; they declare why no id can witness them.
§B The sabotage ledger
evidence/sabotage-ledger.json is { "$comment", "rows": [ … ] }. Each row is closed and has exactly these members:
requirementId: the cited id, or a leg under it (<id>.<leg>).scenario: the.test.tsfile that ran.sabotage: one sentence naming what was broken.subject:{ host, build }, the build the sabotage ran on.suiteVersion: the suite that ran it.result: alwaysexecuted-fail. A sabotage that passed showed nothing.date:YYYY-MM-DD.witnessSha256(optional): the red bundle's digest, when one was cut. It MUST NOT be the digest of a certified committed bundle, because that bundle recorded the pass.
A row is a record that a red run happened. It is not a bundle, and it is not signed: anyone may add a row by PR, and anyone may re-run the sabotage it names. A row the steward adds is steward evidence, like the steward's bundles. For a corpus-gate leg, subject.host is corpus and subject.build the commit.
§C A red run before Accepted
From RFC 0260, for an RFC to be Accepted, every id its Falsifiability table names on a witnessable row MUST have at least one §B row with result: executed-fail. A row for a leg under the id counts.
- This adds to rule 4. Rule 4 still requires an
executed-passrow in a cited certified bundle or the corpus ledger; §C requires that the same leg was once made to fail. - RFCs numbered below 0260 are not retroactively invalidated. Backfilling their rows is invited and tracked (gap G3).
Mechanism
scripts/lib/sabotage-ledger.mjs is the one implementation of §A, §B and §C. check-accepted-predicate.mjs runs it as rule 6 (§A, over every in-scope RFC), rule 5 (§C, at the Accepted check) and a ledger shape check (§B). check-sabotage-ledger.mjs runs the same code on a chosen RFC directory, ledger and bundle directory, which is how the coherence scenario drives it on fixtures.
Compatibility
- No wire, schema, discovery or event change. No host is judged differently, and no bundle changes.
- No
AcceptedRFC changes status: §A starts at RFC 0258 and bindsActive, and §C starts at RFC 0260. - RFCs 0258 and 0259 gain ids on their witnessable rows. The ids are the ones their scenarios already mint, so their
Acceptedbars do not move. Two RFC 0258 rows (§C.4 size cap, §C.5 limits) have no leg and are markedplanned; below RFC 0260 aplannedrow does not blockAccepted, as before. - An RFC author from 0260 on writes ids into the table and records sabotages before the flip. That is new work on the flip, by design.
Security considerations
- The ledger is not signed, so a row could be invented. Its claims are reproducible: it names the scenario, the sabotage and the subject build. An invented row is a false statement in a public file, as an invented
Acceptedclaim would be. It is not a hole that a signature closes, because the steward would sign it. - §B forbids a certified bundle's digest in
witnessSha256. This stops a passing bundle being presented as the red run. - This RFC makes no claim about hosts. It cannot weaken a host's security obligation.
Conformance
The rules are a corpus gate, witnessed by the coherence scenario v2-sabotage-ledger.test.ts on fixture directories and by check-accepted-predicate.mjs on the live tree. No host bundle is involved.
Falsifiability — one row per normative requirement
| Requirement | Observable | Who can cause it | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
§A ids on every witnessable row; planned blocks Accepted from 0260 | check-sabotage-ledger.mjs exit and reason on fixture tables with an id, a bare row, a planned row at Active and at Accepted — v2-sabotage-ledger.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0263.falsifiability-names-ids (corpus) | the suite, unaided | witnessable — unaided (corpus) |
| §B the ledger's closed shape; no certified bundle as the red run | the gate on fixture ledgers: a well-formed row, an executed-pass row, an unknown member, a certified bundle's digest — v2-sabotage-ledger.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0263.ledger-shape (corpus) | the suite, unaided | witnessable — unaided (corpus) |
§C a red row for every cited id before Accepted, from 0260 | the gate on an Accepted fixture RFC with and without a matching executed-fail row — v2-sabotage-ledger.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0263.sabotage-recorded-before-accepted (corpus) | the suite, unaided | witnessable — unaided (corpus) |
| A recorded sabotage actually ran | — | the person who adds the row | claims-check — the row names the scenario, sabotage and build so anyone can re-run it; the gate cannot replay it |
Alternatives considered
- Mutation testing of the suite. Run a mutation tool over each host and keep the legs that go red. This is the general form of the idea, but a host is a black box to the suite: the mutations that matter (break the replay suppression, drop the binding check) are host-internal and differ per host. A named sabotage against one host's build is what we can do today.
- Put the sabotage in the bundle. A bundle records a run; a sabotage is a second run on a different build. Mixing them would make a certified bundle carry red rows, which RFC 0168 refuses. A separate ledger keeps the bundle's meaning intact.
- Make §C retroactive. It would re-open about 90
AcceptedRFCs at once. Most of their legs were in fact sabotaged when written, but the records are in docstrings and commit messages, not in a form the gate can read. A prospective rule with an invited backfill (G3) is the honest version. - Require ids in the table but not
planned. Then an RFC whose table has a row with no leg yet could not be written honestly.plannednames the state and blocksAcceptedfrom 0260.
Unresolved questions
- Should a sabotage row be required to name the commit that reverts the sabotage, so the red build is reproducible from history? Today
subject.buildnames the sabotaged build, which may exist only locally. - Should rule 5 also require the red run's
suiteVersionto be no older than the pass it backs? A leg can change between a sabotage and the cited pass.
Implementation notes (non-normative)
v2-sabotage-ledger.test.tslists its own sabotages in its docstring, as the ledger asks of everyone. One planned sabotage, accepting anyresultin §C, turned nothing red: §B's shape check refuses anexecuted-passrow first. The docstring records that, and a sabotage the §C leg does see (dropping the id match).- The rule caught a real row on its first run: a draft of RFC 0260 in the same branch had a witnessable row with no id.
Acceptance criteria
- [x] Comment window run (
Draft → Active; RFC 0147 §A.6). (Waived by the maintainer, 2026-11-13.) - [x]
scripts/lib/sabotage-ledger.mjs, rules 5 and 6,check-sabotage-ledger.mjsand an emptyevidence/sabotage-ledger.json. (2026-11-13.) - [x] Coherence scenario
v2-sabotage-ledger.test.ts(3 ids), with its sabotages recorded in the docstring. (2026-11-13.) - [x] RFCs 0258 and 0259 name ids on their witnessable rows. (2026-11-13.)
- [x] The three
0263.*ids recordexecuted-passinevidence/corpus-ledger.json(the corpus gate, run bycheck-spec-coherence.mjs). - [x] Register sweep (
RFCS/registers/0263-.gaps.md,.risks.md). (2026-11-15: G5 closed; R3 checked at the first §C flips)*
References
- RFC 0148 (non-vacuous certification), RFC 0174 §B.1 (the
Acceptedpredicate), RFC 0216 (a gate whose fixtures run the gate's own code). docs/EVIDENCE-DISCIPLINE.md, and the August 2026 assessment finding P-001.