Summary
identity.md §2.2 makes every lane name a revocation rule and advertise it. The vocabulary has nine members and not one of them describes the most common real deployment: a host that verifies a JWT's signature, issuer, audience and exp, and never asks the trust root again. Two hosts hit the gap and resolved it in opposite directions. openwop-app omitted its OIDC lane at major 2 rather than state a rule it does not perform — while still advertising the same front door at v1, which needs no rule. MyndHyve advertises short-lived with a 3600-second window while calling verifyIdToken without checkRevoked, so nothing on that host ever asks whether the subject was revoked.
This RFC adds one enum member, exp-only, and makes it the one member that is not cheap: a host advertising it MUST refuse a credential whose total lifetime (exp − iat) or remaining lifetime (exp − now) exceeds the window it advertised, with a new registered code credential_lifetime_exceeded. The window stops being decorative and becomes a number a sabotage can falsify.
It also closes the hatch that let short-lived onto an oidc lane unexamined: nothing in the corpus binds a lane to the rule §2.2's row for it lists. The schema accepts any of the nine on any of the ten lanes, and the suite checks only enum membership and window presence. That leg lands with this filing, because it enforces RFC 0170's table as already written.
There is no numeric ceiling. Upstream has none to borrow (§Motivation), so the corpus's job is that the advertised number be true, not that it be small. The honest substitute for a ceiling is disclosure: INTEROP-MATRIX.md gains a per-lane revocation section, and it lands with this filing so the record does not wait on the RFC.
Motivation
Findings verified read-only on 2026-09-22 against corpus tip eaeffa42, openwop-app main, and myndhyve f2948023f (review/arch-lane-vocab.md).
1. The same code shape produced an omission on one host and a false claim on the other
OidcVerifier.verify() in openwop-app (backend/typescript/src/middleware/oidcVerifier.ts) performs, in order and nothing else: three segments → alg in the allowlist (none rejected) → kid against the issuer JWKS (cached 10 min) → signature → iss exact → aud contains → iat present and numeric → exp > now − 60 → nbf ≤ now + 60 → sub non-empty. There is no introspection call, no userinfo call, no revocation list, no host-side epoch, and no bound on credential lifetime — a structurally valid token whose exp is a year out is accepted.
MyndHyve's posture is byte-for-byte the same: services/workflow-runtime/src/middleware/auth.ts:192, :251, :345 each call admin.auth().verifyIdToken(token) with no second argument, and checkRevoked defaults to false. A repository-wide grep finds zero occurrences of checkRevoked and zero of revokeRefreshTokens.
The two hosts then diverge:
| Host | v2 oidc lane | Why |
|---|---|---|
| openwop-app | absent. routes/discovery.ts v2AuthFamily() emits api-key, session, anonymous only, with a ~30-line ADR 0730 C.3 comment recording the vocabulary gap and that its exp-and-recheck attempt was caught by the suite | no member of the enum is true of it |
| MyndHyve | { lane: 'oidc', revocation: 'short-lived', revocationWindowSeconds: 3600 } (routes/discoveryV2.ts:168–175) | the enum is closed, and this member reads closest |
MyndHyve's two justifications both fail. "Re-verified on every request" re-verifies signature and exp; that is not revocation, and the token survives revocation for its full remaining life — precisely what short-lived is supposed to bound. "Firebase ID tokens expire after one hour" is a property of Google's issuer, not of this host: §2.2 defines short-lived only in the mtls row, as "issue certificates whose lifetime is at most the advertised window". That is an issuer's obligation, and MyndHyve does not mint the credential.
Nothing measures the claim. MyndHyve's own test asserts the string (src/__tests__/discoveryV2.test.ts:108–114: revocation === 'short-lived', window an integer ≥ 1). The corpus's own scenario asserts no more (finding 3).
The variable is the vocabulary, not the honesty of the implementers. One host under-claimed and one over-claimed, both trying to satisfy a closed enum with no member for what they do.
2. The gap also produces a discovery regression between majors
routes/discovery.ts:436–442 pushes the v1 profile openwop-auth-oidc-user-bearer whenever readOidcConfigFromEnv() returns non-null. So openwop-app advertises an OIDC front door at v1 and hides the same front door at v2, for one reason: v2 requires a revocation rule and v1 does not. A truthful host loses a capability by moving to the newer major.
3. Nothing binds a lane to the rule §2.2's row lists
- Schema.
spec/v2/facets/auth.schema.jsonhas noif/thenrelatingrevocationtolane. Any of the nine values is schema-valid on any of the ten lanes. - Suite.
conformance/src/scenarios/v2-lane-issuer-advertised.test.tsasserts (a)revocation ∈ REVOCATIONand (b)revocationWindowSecondspresent and integer ≥ 1 when the rule is windowed. The §2.2 per-lane column is unenforced — which is whyshort-livedonoidcpasses, and why openwop-app'sexp-and-recheckattempt failed on the missing window rather than on the rule.
So the laundering hatch already exists and is already in use. exp-only does not open it; this is the first proposal that closes it.
4. The gap is recorded nowhere in the corpus
Zero hits across RFCS/, spec/, docs/, SECURITY/, schemas/. The nearest is RFCS/0167-openwop-v2-umbrella.md:55, "the lane vocabulary gap (RFC 0165 G6)" — that is the lane enum (which lanes exist), a different surface. RFC 0170 (the owner), 0173 and 0200 do not record it. openwop-app's ADR says the gap was "reported upstream"; the report never landed here. This RFC is the first corpus record.
Worse: RFC 0200 §Examples ships the unsound pattern as its positive example — an oidc lane with a Firebase issuer, "revocation": "short-lived", "revocationWindowSeconds": 3600, copied from MyndHyve. Left alone it normalises the over-claim for every future host.
5. Upstream, checked rather than assumed
| Source | What it actually says |
|---|---|
| OAuth 2.1 §5.2 (draft-16) | a resource server "MUST check that the access token is not yet expired, is authorized to access the requested resource, was issued with the appropriate scope, and meets other policy requirements". Names two token families, including "self-encoded tokens". Introspection appears only as "a standardized method … is defined in [RFC7662]" — not a floor. |
| RFC 9068 | a closed validation checklist ending at exp. Full-text: it contains no revocation discussion whatsoever. Do not cite RFC 9068 for revocation; it has none. |
| MCP 2026-07-28 | servers "MUST validate access tokens as described in [OAuth 2.1 §5.2]"; audience check; "Invalid or expired tokens MUST receive a HTTP 401". No mention of introspection, revocation or token lifetime for the resource server. |
| RFC 7662 §4 | the only upstream text naming a revocation window, and it is about introspection caching: "the token may be revoked while the protected resource is relying on the value of the cached response … This creates a window during which a revoked token could be used", and a response carrying exp "MUST NOT be cached beyond the time indicated therein". An RS caching introspection to exp is equivalent to exp-only validation, and 7662 permits it. |
| Lifetime ceilings | no numeric maximum access-token lifetime exists anywhere upstream. Only qualitative SHOULDs: OAuth 2.1 §7.1.3.5 "authorization servers SHOULD issue short-lived bearer tokens"; MCP security considerations "SHOULD issue short-lived access tokens". OAuth 2.1's one hard number, 10 minutes, is for authorization codes. |
| Disclosure | RFC 9728 has zero occurrences of "revoc", "introspect", "latency" or "lifetime". No upstream metadata document has a field for, or a duty to disclose, revocation propagation delay. |
| Firebase | "Firebase ID tokens are short lived and last for an hour"; "Because Firebase ID tokens are stateless JWTs, you can determine a token has been revoked only by requesting the token's status from the Firebase Authentication backend … an expensive operation, requiring an extra network round trip." Google documents skipping it as an accepted trade-off. |
Upstream permits exp-only implicitly and gives it no name, no ceiling and no disclosure duty. revocation + revocationWindowSeconds is an OpenWOP original with no upstream analogue — which is exactly why the vocabulary must be complete: a disclosure surface with no honest value for the most common deployment forces every host into either silence or a lie, and both happened. This paragraph is a statement about what the cited documents contain, not a claim of superiority or of any external validation (RFC 0147 §A).
Consequence for any ceiling: a numeric maximum would be an OpenWOP invention and MUST NOT be attributed upstream. §B.4 declines to invent one.
Proposal
§A The vocabulary gains exp-only (identity.md §2.2; auth.schema.json)
revocationgains one member,exp-only. Theoauth2andoidcrows of §2.2's table readexp-and-recheck | exp-only. No other row changes.
exp-onlynames a host that honoursexpand performs no revocation re-check. It consults no introspection endpoint, no userinfo endpoint, no revocation list and no host-side epoch orvalidAfterrecord, and a credential revoked at the trust root is accepted until its ownexp.
revocationWindowSeconds(integer ≥ 1) MUST be advertised wherever the rule names a window — nowexp-and-recheck,exp-only,short-livedandrebind. On every lane it is an upper bound on the interval between a revocation at the trust root and the host's first refusal, and a host MUST NOT advertise a window it does not enforce. (§2.2's closing sentence is replaced by this one; the existing three rules keep their meaning, and this sentence states the meaning they already carried.)
§B The window is enforced, and the refusal has its own code
- A host advertising
exp-onlyon a lane MUST refuse a credential presented on that lane when either
- exp − iat > revocationWindowSeconds (the credential's total lifetime), or - exp − now > revocationWindowSeconds (its remaining lifetime),
with 401 and error code credential_lifetime_exceeded. A credential carrying no iat MUST be refused with the same code; the first bound cannot be evaluated without it, and identity.md §2.1's fail-closed rule applies.
Both bounds are load-bearing. exp − iat alone lets a host accept a ten-year token minted ten years ago; exp − now alone lets it accept a freshly minted ten-year token in its ninth year.
- A host that cannot enforce both bounds MUST NOT advertise
exp-only.
credential_lifetime_exceededis a new row inspec/v2/errors.json:httpStatus401,retriablefalse,detailsnull,since2.36,source"RFC 0210 §B". A distinct code is load-bearing, not cosmetic: under a genericunauthenticateda conformance sabotage cannot distinguish "the bound was enforced" from "the host refused for some other reason", and the row would be unfalsifiable. (Precedent for registering a code with its RFC: RFC 0201 §D,webhook_endpoint_unverified.)
- No numeric MUST ceiling.
exp-onlySHOULD be advertised with a window of one hour or less. The corpus sets no maximum, because no upstream specification does (§Motivation 5; OAuth 2.1 §7.1.3.5 states only that an authorization server SHOULD issue short-lived tokens). A hard ceiling, if ever wanted, belongs in a profile predicate carrying its own evidence, not in the vocabulary.
§C Lane restriction
exp-onlyMUST NOT be advertised onapi-keyorsession. On those two lanes the host itself issued the credential, so revocation is in its own hands and it has no excuse; both staynext-request. This restriction is expressed inauth.schema.jsonas anif/thenover the new member only, so it cannot retroactively invalidate any document that validates today (§Compatibility).
§D A lane's advertised rule MUST be one its row lists
- A host MUST NOT advertise a
revocationvalue that §2.2's row for its lane does not list. This restates RFC 0170 §B.3 as already written; it mints no new requirement. What is new is that it is now measured:v2-lane-issuer-advertised.test.tsgains a leg binding each lane to its row's rule set, mintingopenwop.requirement.0170.lane-issuer-advertised.lane-rule. That leg lands with this filing.
- The
anonymousrow's revocation cell is—, and the facet schema nonetheless REQUIRESrevocationon every lane member — so ananonymouslane must advertise something the table does not name. The §D.9 leg therefore leavesanonymousunconstrained and says so in its message. Resolving the—is out of scope here and is register row G1.
§E The unknown-member rule
- A consumer that meets an unrecognized
revocationvalue MUST NOT act on it: it MUST treat the lane as stating no revocation latency, and MUST NOT read it asnext-requestor as any other member. This isoverview.md§0's unknown-member tolerance applied to this enum; §0's category "reason vocabularies" (RFC 0197 §A.2 R4 writes it "registry-backed or advertised enum") coversrevocation, which is advertised rather than registry-backed. The RFC states this explicitly becauserevocationhas no registry file, so §0's "add a row to its registry and regenerate" has no literal referent here (register G2).
§F Disclosure is the honest substitute for a ceiling
INTEROP-MATRIX.mdgains a section stating, per host and per lane, the advertisedrevocation, the advertised window, and what measures it. A reader comparingexp-only 3600againstnext-requestdraws the right conclusion unaided; a reader comparingshort-lived 3600against the note that nothing on that host re-checks draws a different one. This section lands with this filing rather than with the Active flip, so the record of MyndHyve's over-claim does not depend on this RFC landing.
- The correction MyndHyve owes. Either implement the re-check (
verifyIdToken(token, true)), after whichshort-livedis still the wrong member butexp-and-recheckis available and true; or advertiseexp-onlywith a window it enforces under §B. Either way the committed bundle is re-cut. The handoff isreview/handoff-myndhyve-0210.md. Sequencing: RFC 0200's header already requires a MyndHyve deploy of its §A/§B before 0200's first certifying cut — one deploy, both changes.
§G A new corpus gate keeps the three surfaces in lockstep
scripts/check-lane-revocation-rules.mjsderives the lane → rule map fromidentity.md§2.2's table and checks that (a) the facet schema'srevocationenum is exactly the union of the rules the table names, and (b) the suite's enforced map is byte-equal to the table's. It lands with this filing, green on today's tree. Had it existed, the divergence in §Motivation 3 could not have opened.
Compatibility
Classification: additive, under spec/v2/core/overview.md §0 (RFC 0171 §A.5): "A registry-backed enum (event types, error codes, envelope kinds, reason vocabularies, lanes) grows by adding a row … Adding a member is additive in v2.x." credential_lifetime_exceeded is a row in spec/v2/errors.json, which is registry-backed; RFC 0201's webhook_endpoint_unverified is the precedent.
- RFC 0197 §0a does not bind. §0a governs retirement and reshape. Nothing is removed, renamed, retyped, moved, closed or made REQUIRED.
check-v2-surface-monotone.mjsreports no removal;check-v2-retirement.mjsis not engaged. - Every document valid before stays valid. A host on
exp-and-recheck,next-requestor any other member is untouched.authisexperimental/adoption: noneinspec/v2/declaration.json. - §C's schema restriction cannot invalidate anything retroactively. It is an
if/thenwhose antecedent isrevocation === "exp-only"— a value no committed document can carry, because the member does not exist until this RFC isActive. The full lane → rule binding is deliberately not put in the schema:evidence/v2-host-bundles/myndhyve.json:488carriesshort-livedonoidc, and a schemaif/thenover the whole table would make a bundle cut before the rule retroactively invalid — the P1 failure mode RFC 0197 §Motivation records. The binding belongs in the suite, whereCOMPATIBILITY.md§2.3 keeps a bundle "a valid measurement at its suite version". - Where the tightening actually lives: the suite. The §D.9 leg fails a cut from a host advertising a rule its lane's row does not list. On today's committed bundles that is exactly one: MyndHyve. The reference host (
api-key,session,saml,scim,workload) and openwop-app (api-key,session,anonymous) both pass. This is disclosed inconformance/CHANGELOG.mdunder[2.36.0]and in §F's matrix section. MyndHyve's committed 2.35.x bundle stays a valid measurement at its suite version; only cuts taken on the suite minor that ships the leg are affected — the same disposition RFC 0197 §C gave the 38-family maturity over-claim. - Error codes. One code added; none changed or removed. A client that does not know
credential_lifetime_exceededstill sees401and the canonical envelope. - Strict consumers. A consumer validating an
exp-onlyadvertisement against the old facet schema rejects it — the "additive for producers, breaking for strict consumers" hazard RFC 0171 G6 records, with the corpus's usual mitigation (no$idbump; consumers pin@openwop/spec-artifacts).
Conformance
Lands with this filing
v2-lane-issuer-advertised.test.ts— one new leg (major 2, unaided), mintingopenwop.requirement.0170.lane-issuer-advertised.lane-rule. It binds each advertised lane to the rule set §2.2's row for it lists, leavinganonymousunconstrained (§D.10) and naming that exemption in its message. It cites RFC 0170, which isAccepted; it does not cite this RFC, and it enforces nothing this RFC adds.scripts/check-lane-revocation-rules.mjs(§G), wired intoopenwop:checkstage 10.
Lands when this RFC is Active
check-rfc-status-coherence.mjs rule 7 refuses a shipped scenario that cites a Draft RFC, and the precedent is one day old: openwop#1463 filed RFC 0194/0195/0196 Draft and recorded "Specs and scenarios for 0194 and 0196 land when each is Active — a scenario may not cite a Draft RFC."
The spec text, the schema member, the error row and the invariant are held back for a second reason that is this RFC's own argument: shipping exp-only into the enum before its enforcing scenario exists would open, for the length of the comment window, precisely the laundering hatch this RFC was written to close. A member with no measured refusal is strictly cheaper than every alternative and every host would pick it. The member and its teeth land together or not at all.
- New:
conformance/src/scenarios/v2-lane-exp-only-bound.test.ts(major 2). Gated on a lane advertisingexp-only(inapplicable, with that reason, otherwise); harness-gated onOPENWOP_TEST_OIDC_ISSUER_URLfor the minting legs.
- Control leg: a correctly signed token with exp − iat = window − 60, correct iss/aud, not expired → the host MUST accept it. Without the control leg the row passes on a host that refuses everything — the vacuous-witness trap. - Sabotage leg (total lifetime): the same token with exp − iat = window + 60, still unexpired → 401, error.code === "credential_lifetime_exceeded". - Sabotage leg (remaining lifetime): a token whose exp − iat is inside the window but whose exp − now exceeds it (clock-skewed iat) → the same refusal. - Code leg: the refusal carries credential_lifetime_exceeded, not a generic unauthenticated — the distinction §B.6 exists for.
- New:
conformance/src/coherence/v2-lane-exp-only-schema.test.ts(corpus gate only; never reaches a host bundle). Mintsopenwop.requirement.0210.exp-only-lane-restricted—exp-onlyvalidates onoauth2andoidc, is refused onapi-keyandsession, and each refusal is re-run against a facet copy with only the §C.8if/thenremoved, where it MUST pass — andopenwop.requirement.0210.lane-rule-surfaces-agree, which drivescheck-lane-revocation-rules.mjsred once per surface rather than asserting exit 0 on a clean tree. - New invariant
lane-exp-only-lifetime-bounded(tierprotocol, severityhigh, threat modelSECURITY/threat-model-auth-profiles.md, testv2-lane-exp-only-bound.test.ts). It cannot land before its test:check-security-invariants.shrequires every protocol-tier invariant to name at least one public test.
No requirement id enters floorScenarios or a profile predicate.
Falsifiability — one row per normative requirement
| Requirement | Observable — what an outside party sees | Who can cause the condition | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
§A.1–§A.3 exp-only is an advertisable member with a window (witnessed by openwop.requirement.0170.lane-issuer-advertised.members, .window and .lane-rule on a host advertising exp-only) | a lane advertising { "lane": "oidc", "revocation": "exp-only", "revocationWindowSeconds": 3600 } validates against auth.schema.json and passes v2-lane-issuer-advertised. Re-pointed 2026-09-26: the dedicated leg 0210.exp-only-advertised this row planned was never built. The existing legs observe the same thing. On openwop-app's certified production bundle openwop-workflow-engine-2.41.0-image-digest.json, the only windowed lane is oidc: exp-only, 3600, and .window passes with exactly one assertion (that lane), .members and .lane-rule pass, and the facet schema validates it | the suite, unaided, on a host advertising it | witnessable — gated on a host advertising exp-only; witnessed on openwop-app production. Sabotage: removing exp-only from the facet enum fails .members on that host |
§B.4 total lifetime is bounded (openwop.requirement.0210.exp-only-lifetime-bound) | a correctly signed, unexpired token with exp − iat = window + 60 and exp − now inside the window (an iat dated behind the host's clock) is answered 401, and so is one carrying no iat (v2-lane-exp-only-bound.test.ts) | the suite, with a harness issuer (OPENWOP_TEST_OIDC_ISSUER_URL) | witnessable — gated on the harness issuer and an exp-only lane. Sabotage: delete the exp − iat comparison in the host verifier and the leg passes the oversized token. The skew is load-bearing and was found by running that sabotage (row S6 below): a token minted at now with exp past the window is outside BOTH bounds, so a host enforcing only exp − now refuses it and the row goes green over a broken host. §B.4's first example — the ten-year token minted ten years ago — is the only shape that isolates this bound |
§B.4 remaining lifetime is bounded (openwop.requirement.0210.exp-only-remaining-bound) | a token with exp − iat inside the window but exp − now beyond it is answered 401 | as above | witnessable — gated as above. Sabotage: keep only the exp − iat comparison and the skewed token is accepted |
§B.4 a control credential is accepted (openwop.requirement.0210.exp-only-control-accepted) | a token at exp − iat = window − 60 is accepted on the same lane, in the same run | as above | witnessable — gated as above. Sabotage: refuse every token and this leg fails, which is what makes the two refusal legs non-vacuous. Run as row S10 |
§B.6 the refusal names its own code (openwop.requirement.0210.credential-lifetime-code) | the 401 envelope carries error.code === "credential_lifetime_exceeded", a code registered in spec/v2/errors.json | as above | witnessable — gated as above. Sabotage: refuse with unauthenticated and the leg fails |
§C.8 exp-only is refused on api-key and session (openwop.requirement.0210.exp-only-lane-restricted) | { "lane": "api-key", "revocation": "exp-only" } fails auth.schema.json validation | the suite, unaided (corpus) | witnessable — unaided (corpus), v2-lane-exp-only-schema.test.ts: each negative is validated a second time against a copy of the facet with ONLY the if/then removed and MUST pass there, so it cannot be failing for any other reason |
§D.9 a lane advertises only a rule its row lists (openwop.requirement.0170.lane-issuer-advertised.lane-rule) | a host advertising revocation: "short-lived" on an oidc lane fails the leg; anonymous is exempt and the message says so (v2-lane-issuer-advertised.test.ts, shipped with this filing) | the suite, unaided, against any v2 host | witnessable — unaided: it fails MyndHyve's captured discovery document today and passes the reference host's and openwop-app's. Sabotage run: §Implementation notes |
| §E.11 an unknown member is read as "no stated latency" | a consumer meeting revocation: "x-vendor-thing" does not treat the lane as next-request | — | unwitnessable (claims-check) — a rule about consumer behaviour inside a client, not observable on the host's wire; stated so a client author has a rule to follow rather than a default to guess |
§G.14 the table, the schema enum and the suite map agree (openwop.requirement.0210.lane-rule-surfaces-agree) | scripts/check-lane-revocation-rules.mjs exits 0 (shipped with this filing; minted as a row by v2-lane-exp-only-schema.test.ts when this RFC went Active) | the corpus gate, unaided | witnessable — unaided (corpus): the test drives the gate red one surface at a time in a throwaway corpus copy — an enum member with no §2.2 row, and a suite LANE_RULES entry the table does not license — and asserts the refusal names the surface that diverged |
Correction (2026-09-25) — the §B rows' gate. The four rows above read "gated on the harness issuer", and the scenario recorded
blockedwhenever the harness was not the host's trust root. A production host MUST NOT trust a test issuer: a deployed service that accepts tokens signed by a key on a test runner has an authentication bypass. So every honest production bundle advertisingexp-onlycarried fourblockedrows, and RFC 0168 §E.1 makes oneblockedrow deny certification bundle-wide. This was measured on openwop-app (its ADR 0745, corpus defect 1). These rows areseam-gated(SECURITY/invariants.yamllane-exp-only-lifetime-bounded), and RFC 0168 §C.1 already rules on an unclaimed suite instrument: it isinapplicable, andblockedis reserved for a claimed instrument that does not answer. A host claims the harness issuer the way it claims any trust root, by listing it in the lane'sissuers[]. From suite 2.40.2 the scenario therefore:- records
inapplicable, naming the issuers the lane does trust, when theexp-onlylane'sissuers[]does not listOPENWOP_TEST_OIDC_ISSUER_URL;- runs when the lane lists the harness issuer, and records
blockedor a failure as before.No MUST, schema or wire shape changes. Residual, stated: a production bundle witnesses none of the four rows, exactly as it witnesses no seam-gated row. The §B witness comes from a cut whose lane lists the harness issuer: the reference host, or a colocated boot of the same release image. Linking such a companion cut to the production bundle it vouches for (by
host.build) would be a verifier and certification change, which is an RFC of its own and is not made here. Register G4 (noexecuted-passon a committed bundle) is unchanged by this correction.
Alternatives considered
- Mandate a real re-check on
oauth2/oidc. Upstream requires it nowhere (§Motivation 5); Google documents skipping it; it binds a protocol-generic lane to a per-request vendor round trip plus an IAM grant. And the corpus already has the value for a host that does it —exp-and-recheck, with its cache window. Making the re-check mandatory would delete the only truthful description of the majority deployment. Whether to pay for the round trip stays a product decision. - Leave the vocabulary alone. The one option that leaves a false statement standing in a bundle certified
openwop-core-standard, keepsshort-lived-on-oidcas the pattern RFC 0200 §Examples teaches, and preserves the v1/v2 discovery regression on the honest host (§Motivation 2). It also does not buy what it appears to: MyndHyve advertisesoidctoday and is therefore bound by RFC 0200 §A/§B, so 0200 has a production witness either way — the problem is that 0200's only production witness reaches its lane gate through an unsound advert. - Add
exp-onlywith no enforced bound. This is the version of this proposal that would be manufactured evidence: openwop-app could advertise the lane with a one-line diff and nothing observable would change. §B is what makes the advertisement cost something. - A numeric MUST ceiling (say, 3600 s). Inventing a maximum and implying upstream backing would be exactly the "industry standard" claim RFC 0147 §A bans. The corpus's job is that the number be true, not that it be small. Disclosure (§F) plus enforcement (§B) beat a number nobody upstream wrote down.
- Ban
exp-onlyfromopenwop-core-standard. Tempting and wrong. It restores today's two failure modes — a truthful host omits the lane, or an eager host launders it asshort-lived— with the added harm that omitting the lane now also costs the profile, so the ban would push hosts toward the dishonest option. A vocabulary that punishes the honest answer will not be answered honestly. - Fold this into RFC 0200. 0200 is the tempting host:
Active, already amendingidentity.md, already blocked by this gap, an override already recorded, one window instead of two. Declined on scope (§2.2 is RFC 0170's surface; 0200 is scoped to inbound protected-resource discovery and touches §2.1 and a new §2.5) and, decisively, on governance — see theUpdatedfield. - Put the full lane → rule binding in the schema. Retroactively invalidates MyndHyve's committed bundle (§Compatibility).
Unresolved questions
- The
anonymousrow's revocation cell is—while the schema requires the field. What should ananonymouslane advertise? Both production hosts that have one advertisenext-request. Register G1. revocationWindowSecondsis not conditionally required by the schema, only by prose and one scenario leg. Making itif/then-required on the windowed rules would hit the same retroactive-invalidation problem as the full lane → rule binding. Register G3.- Should
revocationbecome a registry file (spec/v2/revocation.json) so §0's "add a row and regenerate" has a literal referent? Tidier; probably not worth the churn for a ten-member enum. Register G2. - Should
exp-onlyon a lane whoseminimumAssuranceissender-constrainedget a longer SHOULD window, since a stolen token is not replayable? Not decided here; no host has asked.
Implementation notes (non-normative)
- Host work to witness §B. openwop-app: add the two comparisons to
OidcVerifier.verify()(≈3 lines) and then advertise theoidclane inv2AuthFamily(), rewriting the ADR 0730 C.3 comment to record the resolution rather than the gap. Tierself/tier-1. MyndHyve: the same bound,short-lived→exp-only, re-cut; tier-2 (steward-affiliated sibling — sufficient to graduate under the single-witness waiver, and it does not fire the INTEROP non-steward tripwire). This is not manufactured evidence: openwop-app genuinely operates an OIDC front door and says so in its own v1 advert (discovery.ts:442); the lifetime bound is a real behaviour change that host does not perform today and that a sabotage can falsify. - Sabotage matrix for the §D.9 leg and the §G.14 gate, executed 2026-09-22 on the v2-reference host at loopback (throwaway worktree, reverted and removed; no host change was committed). Each row was run as its own boot, with the new process confirmed to own the port and the served discovery document confirmed to carry the sabotage before the row was believed.
| # | Condition | Expected | Observed |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | control — host unchanged, oidc lane advertised with exp-and-recheck / 300 | pass, non-vacuously | 3/3 tests pass; …lane-rule executed-pass, no partial-witness: detail |
| C2 | control — host unchanged, no oidc lane (5 lanes) | pass | 3/3 pass |
| S1 | oidc advertises short-lived / 3600 — MyndHyve's exact advertisement | lane-rule fails | executed-fail: lane oidc advertises revocation "short-lived", which §2.2's row for that lane does not list (it lists "exp-and-recheck"). The two pre-existing legs (members, window) still pass — which is the gap. |
| S2 | saml advertises crl (a rule §2.2 states only for mtls) | lane-rule fails | executed-fail, naming saml and crl — the leg is not oidc-specific |
| S3 | an anonymous lane advertises crl | pass (the lane is exempt) | 3/3 pass — the exemption is a real hole, recorded as register G1, not papered over |
| S4 | gate: exp-only added to the facet enum with no §2.2 table row | gate fails | exit 1: the revocation enum is not the union of §2.2's rules — in the schema only: [exp-only] |
| S5 | gate: the suite's LANE_RULES widened for oidc without the table | gate fails | exit 1: lane oidc: §2.2 says [exp-and-recheck]; conformance LANE_RULES says [exp-and-recheck, short-lived] |
- Sabotage matrix for §B, executed 2026-09-23 on the v2-reference host at loopback (throwaway
openwop-examplesworktree carrying an env-gatedexp-onlyadvertisement plus the two comparisons inoidc-lane.ts; reverted and the worktree removed — no host change was committed, and no bundle was cut, so the four §B rows remain owed on a committed bundle). Each row was its own boot: the previous pid was killed,lsof -ti :3939confirmed free, the sabotage confirmed present in the sourcetsxloads, and the NEW pid confirmed to own the port before any row was believed (the EADDRINUSE false-pass hazard).
| # | Condition | Expected | Observed |
|---|---|---|---|
| C3 | control — oidc lane advertising exp-only / 300 s, both bounds enforced | pass, non-vacuously | 4/4 tests, 5 requirement ids executed-pass, no inapplicable, no partial-witness: detail |
| S6 | delete the exp − iat comparison, scenario as first written (token minted at now) | total-lifetime leg fails | it passed. The fixture was outside both bounds, so exp − now refused it and the row measured the wrong clause. The scenario was corrected to date iat behind the host's clock; this row is why |
| S7 | delete the exp − iat comparison, corrected scenario | total-lifetime leg fails | executed-fail ×2 — the total-lifetime leg and the §B.6 code leg. Control and remaining-lifetime legs still pass, so the sabotage is isolated to the clause it broke |
| S8 | keep only the exp − iat comparison | remaining-lifetime leg fails | executed-fail; the other three legs pass |
| S9 | enforce both bounds, refuse with a generic unauthenticated | the §B.6 code leg fails | executed-fail ×3 (both refusal legs assert the code; the control still passes) — which is precisely why §B.6 registers a distinct code |
| S10 | refuse every token on the lane | the control leg fails | executed-fail: the control goes red and the two refusal legs stop counting as evidence — the vacuous-witness trap, caught |
| S11 | advertise exp-only on the api-key lane (§C.8) | the host cannot serve a valid discovery document | 500 from the host's own strict validation: data/auth/lanes/0/lane must NOT be valid; data/auth/lanes/0 must match "then" schema |
- Core word delta: 0 for this filing (no
spec/v2/core/prose lands). WhenActive, §A–§E add roughly 190 words toidentity.md§2.2 against a cap headroom of 2,661 (check-core-budget: 27,339 / 30,000), so no family needs homing to fund it. Measured on the landing tree: +349 words (27,339 → 27,688 / 30,000), not the ~190 estimated — the §2.2 paragraph states both bounds, the no-iatcase and the two lanes the member is refused on, and the estimate counted the rule without the clauses that make it enforceable. Headroom after: 2,312. No family needed homing. - Regenerate order when
Active:auth.schema.jsonanderrors.jsonby hand →generate-error-envelope.mjs --write→generate-spec-artifacts.mjs --write→generate-requirement-registry.mjs --write→generate-scenario-majors.mjs --write→generate-protocol-status.mjs --write.
Acceptance criteria
- [ ] reason: window waived by steward override (see below). ~~The public comment window closes (2026-09-29) with no unresolved objection, and the RFC moves
Draft → Activewithout a waiver.~~ Not met as written, and recorded rather than rewritten. The window did not run: the steward waived it on 2026-09-23 as an explicit override of RFC 0147 §A.6 (Updated;MAINTAINERS.mdledger row 0210). Acceptance is therefore provisional and the RFC 0156 §B retrospective review is owed —docs/WAIVER-RETROSPECTIVE-REGISTER.mdrow 0210, outcomenot-reviewed. - [x]
INTEROP-MATRIX.mddiscloses, per host and per lane, the advertised revocation rule, its window, and what measures it — including MyndHyve'sshort-livedover-claim, recorded independently of this RFC's fate (§F.12). - [x]
scripts/check-lane-revocation-rules.mjskeeps §2.2's table, the facet enum and the suite's map in lockstep, and is green on the tree it landed on (§G.14). - [x]
v2-lane-issuer-advertised.test.tsbinds each lane to its row's rule set,anonymousexempted and named (§D.9), with the sabotage run recorded in §Implementation notes. - [x]
identity.md§2.2,auth.schema.json,spec/v2/errors.jsonandSECURITY/invariants.yamlcarry §A–§C, andgenerate-error-envelope --check/generate-spec-artifacts --checkpass. The §2.2 table'soauth2andoidcrows readexp-and-recheck | exp-only; the facet gains the member and the §C.8if/then;credential_lifetime_exceededis asince: "2.36"row; the invariant islane-exp-only-lifetime-bounded, traced inthreat-model-auth-profiles.md§4.4. - [x] The member and its teeth landed in the same change (§Conformance's second reason for holding §A back).
v2-lane-exp-only-bound.test.tsships with the enum member, carrying the control leg and both refusal legs;v2-lane-exp-only-schema.test.tsmints the §C.8 and §G.14 corpus rows. At no point does the corpus offerexp-onlywith nothing measuring it. - [x]
v2-lane-exp-only-bound.test.tsrecordsexecuted-passfor all four §B ids on a committed bundle from a host advertisingexp-only, with the control leg passing in the same run as the two refusal legs. Met 2026-09-26: openwop-app, through the RFC 0216 pair above. The committed companionopenwop-app-colocated-companion-2.41.0.jsoncarries all four ids and the scenario row atexecuted-passin one run, and the gate credits them because it pairs with the certified production bundle of the same image digest. - [ ] deferred: a second, independent witness (tier-2) records the same rows. Reason: no second host advertises
exp-only. MyndHyve, the only tier-2 host, took §F.13's other branch and advertises the strongerexp-and-recheck(a revocation re-check on every request), soexp-onlybinds nothing there and the §B rows are correctlyinapplicable. The box ticks when a second host advertisesexp-only. Until then the RFC rests on one host for this member, as the repo's single-witness practice allows. - [x] MyndHyve's advertisement is corrected and its bundle re-cut (§F.13), so no committed bundle advertises a rule nothing measures. Met 2026-09-26: MyndHyve implemented the re-check and advertises
oidc: exp-and-recheckwith a 60 s window. The committed certified 2.40.2 bundle (openwop#1601) passes0170.lane-issuer-advertised.lane-rule. - [x] CHANGELOG entry.
References
- OAuth 2.1 draft-16 §1.4, §5.2, §7.1.3.5; <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1>, fetched 2026-09-22.
- RFC 9068 §4, §5 (full-text checked for "revoc": no occurrence); <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9068>, fetched 2026-09-22.
- RFC 7662 §4 (introspection caching and the revocation window); <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662>, fetched 2026-09-22.
- RFC 9728 (full-text checked for "revoc", "introspect", "latency", "lifetime": no occurrence); <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9728>, fetched 2026-09-22.
- MCP 2026-07-28, Authorization §"Token Validation" and Security Considerations; <https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28>, fetched 2026-09-22.
- Firebase, "Verify ID Tokens" and "Manage session cookies / revoke refresh tokens"; <https://firebase.google.com/docs/auth/admin/verify-id-tokens>, fetched 2026-09-22.
- RFC 0170 §B.2–§B.3 (
spec/v2/core/identity.md§2.2, the owning surface); RFC 0171 §A.5 /spec/v2/core/overview.md§0 (additive enum growth); RFC 0197 §0a and §C (retirement; a bundle is evidence at its suite version); RFC 0201 §D (error-code registration precedent); RFC 0200 §Examples and itsUpdatedoverride; RFC 0147 §A and §A.6; openwop#1463 (theDraft-filing precedent). review/arch-lane-vocab.md— the architect ruling this RFC implements, with the read-only verification of both hosts.