Summary
security-defaults.md §"Onward hops" forbids attaching "credential material carried in a body" to any outbound request, A2A included, and allows only "credentials the host holds for that destination". An A2A CreateTaskPushNotificationConfig arrives with exactly such material — authentication.credentials and token in its body — and A2A v1.0.1 §4.3.3 says the agent MUST send it back on every push. Read literally, the two rules make A2A push unsatisfiable: a host that advertises a2a.pushNotifications violates one or the other. This RFC resolves the contradiction by naming what that credential is — a credential the client gave the host for one destination and one purpose — and binding it there.
It also closes three gaps the contradiction was hiding: the delivery-time egress checks (webhooks.md §Egress) were never said to apply to push, so DNS rebinding and a redirect could carry that credential to an internal address; a replay fork was never said not to push; and a foreign push-config id was never said to be indistinguishable from an unknown one. Everything here binds only a host advertising a2a.pushNotifications. None does today.
Motivation
Verified read-only on 2026-09-23 against corpus d593ad55 and openwop-app main.
1. The corpus forbids what A2A requires
spec/v2/core/security-defaults.md§"Onward hops": "A host MUST NOT attach a credential it received inbound (…, or credential material carried in a body) to any outbound request: A2A, MCP, webhook, callback,httpClientor connector. Outbound authentication uses only credentials the host holds for that destination." Invariantinbound-credential-no-passthrough(reference-impl, critical) restates it.- A2A v1.0.1 §4.3.3: "The agent MUST include authentication credentials in the request headers as specified in the …
authenticationfield" —Authorization: {scheme} {credentials}.TaskPushNotificationConfig.authenticationand.tokenarrive in the Create request body. - The interop map already requires the host to hold them: rows
:104-123saytokenandauthentication.credentialsare "secrets held by reference" and never returned. The corpus requires a host to store the credential and forbids it to use it.
2. Registration is checked; delivery is not
a2a-push-egress-ssrf (protocol, critical) and v1 a2a-integration.md D.6 check the push url at registration — scheme and address arms (the 2026-08-25 Class 3 correction). webhooks.md §Egress's delivery-time rules (re-resolve, validate every address, connect without re-resolving, refuse redirects) are stated for webhooks only. A push URL that resolves public at registration and private at delivery, or that answers 307 to a metadata endpoint, passes every stated rule — and carries a client credential with it. The reference host's dormant push sink follows redirects (openwop-app routes/registerAllRoutes.ts:328-341).
3. Replay and isolation are silent for push
replay.md §Suppression Fan-out and webhooks.md §Replay forbid delivering re-emitted fixed history to "webhook delivery, outbound streams"; A2A push is not named, and nothing says whether a fork inherits a push config. v1 a2a-integration.md:497 makes push-config reads on an unreadable task TaskNotFoundError, but nothing covers a foreign configId on a readable task, nor says config ids must not encode tenant.
4. A stale citation
RFC 0100 §4 (:82, :104) says push "HMAC/signing follows A2A §4.3.3". A2A 1.0.1 §4.3.3 defines no HMAC; v1 a2a-integration.md §"What openwop does NOT specify" already says openwop adds no push signing.
Proposal
§A A push credential is a destination credential (the correction)
security-defaults.md §"Onward hops" gains: an A2A push-config credential (authentication.credentials, token) is a credential the client gave the host for its registered push URL; the host MAY attach it only to a push delivery to that URL's origin, MUST NOT attach it after a redirect or to any other request, and MUST discard it when the config is deleted or the task reaches a terminal state and its final push is attempted. It MUST remain held by reference and MUST NOT enter the event log, persisted run state, a debug bundle or any response (interop map :104-123, unchanged). This is the one exception to "credentials the host holds for that destination", and it is narrower than it: the destination is fixed by the client at registration.
§B A push is an egress under the webhook rules
A push delivery is subject to webhooks.md §Egress at delivery time — re-resolve, validate every resolved address, connect to the validated address without re-resolving, refuse to follow redirects — as well as at registration. A 3xx is a failed delivery.
§C Delivery semantics
A host MUST attempt each push at least once. A host that retries MUST follow webhooks.md retryPolicy semantics (bounded attempts, backoff). Push dead-letters are not visible to A2A clients (GET /webhooks/{id}/dead-letters is keyed by a subscription id a push config is not); a client recovers state with GetTask. The body is an A2A 1.0 StreamResponse with Content-Type: application/a2a+json. A host MUST NOT add an OpenWOP signature to an A2A push: an A2A client has no way to learn the secret. When authentication is absent and token is present, the host SHOULD send token as Authorization: Bearer <token>; otherwise token is not sent. SHOULD, not MUST: A2A v1.0.1 does not define the carriage and the SDKs disagree (a2a-js may use X-A2A-Notification-Token), so a MUST here could fail a receiver that follows an SDK (Unresolved question 1).
§D Replay forks never push
A replay fork MUST NOT deliver an A2A push for re-emitted history, and no fork (replay or branch) inherits a source run's push configs.
§E Push-config isolation
Get/List/Delete of a push config on a task the caller cannot read, or of a configId that is not that task's, MUST answer exactly as for an unknown id, apart from the JSON-RPC id. A configId MUST NOT encode a tenant, workspace or principal. Delete MUST be idempotent (upstream §3.1.10).
What stays
v2Operation stays null on rows :104-123: the webhook operations are tenant-scoped with a webhook-delivery.schema.json body; a push is task-scoped with a StreamResponse body. The webhook engine is a host's implementation choice, not a wire mapping.
Compatibility
- §A is a W3C Process Class 3 correction (
COMPATIBILITY.md§3, RFC 0197 §A.4): conforming to both rules was impossible for any host advertisinga2a.pushNotifications, so the prior text had no satisfiable reading. Census: 0 of 3 committedevidence/v2-host-bundles/*.jsonadvertisea2a.pushNotifications: true(openwop-host-v2-referenceadvertisesfalse;myndhyveandopenwop-workflow-enginecarry noa2afacet). No schema pointer moves, so there is nospec/v2/corrections.jsonrow — that register holds Class 3 corrections that move a shape (corrections.schema.json$defs.row.properties.class: "A Class 2 editorial change moves no shape and needs no row"; a prose-only Class 3 correction is recorded in §3 alone, as the 2026-09-22 OIDCaudentry was). - §B–§E are additive (§4, new requirements on previously-undefined behavior), each gated on
a2a.pushNotifications. - Schema descriptions only.
a2a-task-state.schema.jsonPushConfig.urlstill abbreviates the SSRF guard to its address arm (the 2026-08-25 correction reached v1 and the RFC but not this v2 description);tokenFingerprintcites a nonexistent HMAC. Both descriptions are corrected; no keyword, type orrequiredchanges, socheck-v2-surface-monotonesees nothing. The v2 file'sx-openwop-seeded-from: v1marker is removed: the corrected descriptions are a v2-only edit, so this RFC now owns the file (derive-v2-schemas.mjsconvention); the v1 source is unchanged.
Conformance
Honest statement first: every host-behavior requirement here binds only a host that advertises a2a.pushNotifications, and at filing none did. (Since 2026-09-24 v2-reference advertises it on PUBLIC=1 cuts — openwop-examples#85 — and the delivery legs below have landed.) The legs below are the ones witnessable without a push implementation, and they witness the refusal path and the corpus, not §A–§E themselves.
Leg (in v2-a2a-operation-map.test.ts) | Gate | Assertion | Sabotage | Applicable today? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
a2a-push-unadvertised-refused | a2a 1.0 advertised, pushNotifications not true | all four push-config operations answer -32003 PushNotificationNotSupportedError (map :104-123 "else PushNotificationNotSupportedError") | host answers -32601 (openwop-app today for Get/List/Delete) | yes — at filing the one host-witnessable leg (amended 2026-09-26: since openwop-examples#85 every leg here is witnessable). It witnesses the map's unadvertised row; for Get/List/Delete that clause was authored by this RFC (interop-map.json:122), so it is this RFC's behaviour, not only a pre-existing one |
a2a-push-register-ssrf (landed 2026-09-24) | pushNotifications: true | Create with http:// and a private-address URL ⇒ refused (moves the seam-driven check onto the real operation) | accept http://push.example.com/ | no host |
a2a-push-config-isolation (landed 2026-09-24) | pushNotifications: true | foreign configId / foreign task ⇒ same bytes as unknown | leak a distinct reason | no host |
a2a-push-secrets-not-returned (landed 2026-09-24) | pushNotifications: true | Get/List never echo credentials or token; a sentinel credential is absent from GetTask, the event log and the debug bundle | echo it | no host |
delivery legs in v2-a2a-push-delivery.test.ts (landed 2026-09-24): a2a-push-delivery-authenticated (§A/§C), a2a-push-no-openwop-signature (§C), a2a-push-no-redirect (§B), a2a-push-discard-on-delete (§A), a2a-push-fork-no-push (§D) | pushNotifications: true + a public HTTPS receiver (lib/scoped-receiver.ts, the RFC 0158 receiver) | registered Authorization, no OpenWOP-Signature, 0 hits at a 307 target, 0 hits after Delete, count unchanged across a replay fork | follow the redirect; keep the deleted config; copy configs onto the fork | v2-reference with OPENWOP_A2A_PUSH=1 on a PUBLIC=1 cut (openwop-examples#85) |
Corpus coherence (lands with this RFC, conformance/src/coherence/v2-push-credential-coherent.test.ts, requirement openwop.requirement.0214.push-credential-coherent): the carve-out sentence in security-defaults.md, interop.md §"A2A push delivery", webhooks.md §Egress, replay.md Fan-out and the rule text of both push-config map rows each carry their clause; the same it feeds seven sabotaged copies (each clause removed) and asserts every one is refused. It witnesses the text, not host behavior.
The host leg a2a-push-unadvertised-refused was run before merge against a suite-local stub host: -32003 on all four operations records executed-pass; the same stub answering -32601 records executed-fail with "expected -32601 to be -32003". A stub is a sabotage harness, not a witness.
Falsifiability — one row per normative requirement
| Requirement | Observable | Who can cause the condition | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
§A credential only to registered origin — openwop.requirement.0214.a2a-push-delivery-authenticated, openwop.requirement.0214.a2a-push-no-redirect | Authorization at a suite-owned receiver; absence at a redirect target | the suite, with a public HTTPS receiver | witnessable |
§A discard on delete/terminal — openwop.requirement.0214.a2a-push-discard-on-delete | no further authenticated POST after Delete | the suite | witnessable |
§A never in log/state/response — openwop.requirement.0214.a2a-push-secrets-not-returned | sentinel absent from Create/Get/List, GetTask, the run snapshot and event log (v2 exposes no debug-bundle read) | the suite | witnessable |
§B delivery-time egress, no redirect — openwop.requirement.0214.a2a-push-no-redirect, openwop.requirement.0214.a2a-push-register-ssrf | receiver answers 307 → no request at the target; private/non-https registration refused (the DNS re-resolve arm is host-unit-tested — the suite does not control the host's resolver) | the suite (public receiver) | witnessable |
§C at least one attempt — openwop.requirement.0214.a2a-push-delivery-authenticated | receiver count ≥ 1 after a transition | the suite | witnessable |
§C no OpenWOP signature — openwop.requirement.0214.a2a-push-no-openwop-signature | absence of OpenWOP-Signature at the receiver | the suite | witnessable |
§D replay fork never pushes — openwop.requirement.0214.a2a-push-fork-no-push | receiver count unchanged across a replay fork | the suite (needs replay) | witnessable |
§E isolation — openwop.requirement.0214.a2a-push-config-isolation | byte comparison of the answers | the suite | witnessable |
unadvertised ⇒ -32003 (Create: pre-existing map row; Get/List/Delete: clause authored by this RFC, interop-map.json:122) | JSON-RPC error code | the suite, unaided | witnessable |
Security
- New
a2a-push-credential-destination-bound(reference-impl atActive, critical;witnessable-gated) — §A. Graduates to protocol only on a non-vacuous executed-pass on a deployed host advertising push. - New
a2a-push-secrets-not-returned(reference-impl atActive, high;witnessable-gated) — §A last sentence + map rows. Same graduation rule. - Extended
a2a-push-egress-ssrf— its note gains the delivery-time arm (§B). inbound-credential-no-passthrough— note gains one sentence naming the §A exception, so the two invariants cannot be read as contradicting.
Alternatives considered
- Forbid A2A push outright. Rejected: push is an optional upstream capability the corpus already maps; the contradiction, not the capability, is the defect.
- Require the host to mint its own push credential and ignore the client's. Rejected: an A2A client verifies pushes with the credential it registered (§4.3.3 "Clients MUST validate webhook authenticity using the provided authentication credentials"); a host-minted one cannot be verified.
- Add OpenWOP HMAC signing to pushes. Rejected: A2A defines no secret exchange, so the client cannot verify it.
- Map the rows to
registerWebhook. Rejected: different scope (tenant vs task) and body (webhook-deliveryvsStreamResponse). - Implement push now. Deferred at filing (program decision D2): optional upstream, no v2 host advertises it, the reference host has it off, and a delivery witness needs a public-receiver harness. Reversed 2026-09-24: the public-receiver harness already existed (
lib/scoped-receiver.ts, the RFC 0158 receiver), so v2-reference implemented push behindOPENWOP_A2A_PUSH(openwop-examples#85) and the delivery legs landed; no test seam relaxes the §B guard.
Unresolved questions
- A2A v1.0.1 does not say how
tokenis carried. §C recommends (SHOULD)Authorization: Bearerwhenauthenticationis absent; tighten to MUST only once upstream settles it (program Phase 6).
Editorial
RFC 0100 §4 (:82, :104): replace "its HMAC/signing follows A2A §4.3.3 (openwop defers the HMAC details …)" with "A2A 1.0.1 §4.3.3 defines no payload signing; the push carries the client's registered authentication (RFC 0214 §A, §C)". a2a-task-state.schema.json tokenFingerprint description: drop "The A2A push HMAC details (A2A §4.3.3) stay inside the A2A layer".
Acceptance criteria
- [x] Prose, map rule text, schema descriptions, invariants, COMPATIBILITY §3 entry and the coherence check land (
ActivePR). - [x]
a2a-push-unadvertised-refusedrecordsexecuted-passon a deployed tier-1 host: the certified public v2-reference cut on published 2.38.0 (openwop#1542, commit20a8cbd5, build1157625f, witness669d926abf45, signedv2-reference-4, 385 pass / 0 fail / 0 blocked, relaxations[]; discovery advertisesa2a1.0 withpushNotifications: false). All four push-config operations returned-32003(6 assertions). The later push-on cuts (#1558, #1575) replaced this bundle in the tree and record the row, correctly,inapplicable. openwop-app, named here at filing, does not advertisea2aat major 2 and is not the witness. - [x] A deployed host advertising
a2a.pushNotifications: truerecordsexecuted-passon the §A/§B/§E legs with a suite-owned public HTTPS receiver (a host's own ledger is not a witness): the certified public v2-reference cut on published 2.39.5 (openwop#1575; buildcommit:2c6fc3c, witness09587c853ea2, signedv2-reference-4, 399 pass / 0 fail / 0 blocked, relaxations[], RFC 0158 rungdurable-single-instance; receiver =lib/scoped-receiver.tsbehind the public front):0214.a2a-push-register-ssrf,.a2a-push-config-isolation,.a2a-push-secrets-not-returned,.a2a-push-delivery-authenticated,.a2a-push-no-openwop-signature,.a2a-push-no-redirect,.a2a-push-discard-on-delete,.a2a-push-fork-no-push— allexecuted-pass. (D2 was reversed 2026-09-24: openwop-examples#85.) - [x] RFC 0156 §B retrospective row for this override exists (
not-reviewed) —docs/WAIVER-RETROSPECTIVE-REGISTER.mdrow 0214.
References
A2A v1.0.1 docs/specification.md §3.1.7–§3.1.10, §4.3.3, §13.2; RFC 0100 §4; RFC 0147 §A.6; RFC 0197 §A.4; RFC 0200 §E; spec/v2/core/security-defaults.md §"Onward hops"; spec/v2/core/webhooks.md §Egress, §Replay; spec/v2/core/replay.md §Suppression; spec/v1/a2a-integration.md D.6, §E.