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RFC details authors, dates, what it affects, review history
FieldValue
RFC0259
Titleinterrupt.resolved records the instrument of a token resolution (resolvedVia) beside who authenticated (resolvedBy)
StatusAccepted
Author(s)David Tufts (@davidscotttufts)
Created2026-11-04
Updated2026-11-16 — Active → Accepted; §B review deferred by steward exemption (2026-10-17). Evidence tier: tier-1 — the v2 reference host's certified 2.49.5 public cut (openwop-host-v2-reference-2.49.5-44c4e59.json, build commit:44c4e59, 581/0/0, egress guard closed, no relaxation, signed v2-reference-4): legs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 are executed-pass; leg 4 (token-ref-opaque) is inapplicable because the host records no tokenRef, which is OPTIONAL (R2 stays open until a host mints one). Host implementation: openwop-examples #185. Earlier 2026-11-08 — Draft → Active, comment window waived by the maintainer (user instruction to openwop-be, 2026-11-08: "skip the comment window and proceed with implementation by collaborating with an openwop-app session"). STEWARD OVERRIDE of RFC 0147 §A.6 (identity and authorization), recorded in MAINTAINERS.md. Lands the interruptResolved.resolvedVia schema and the resolvedBy description, the interrupt.resolvedVia facet, the readInterruptToken seam, the threat-model row and v2-interrupt-resolved-via (7 ids) in suite 2.46.44, from the drafted rfc/0259-resolved-via-impl. UQ 1–6 decided below; §A.1 is classified a restatement (additive). openwop-app implements it (its ADR 1059, #5585) behind a default-off flag. Earlier 2026-11-04 — filed as Draft. This RFC touches identity and authorization, so Draft → Active runs the full comment window: RFC 0147 §A.6 forbids a bootstrap waiver here, and only the maintainer may override it, directly. The wire shape may still move during the window. An independent architect review (§Alternatives 1) replaced the filed-for shape — a new Subject kind — before any text was written.
Affectsschemas/v2/run-event-payloads.schema.json $defs/interruptResolved (resolvedBy description = §A.1's normative home; new optional resolvedVia = §A.2–§A.5's) · spec/v2/facets/interrupt.schema.json + spec/v2/declaration.json (new optional resolvedVia facet; schemas/v2/capabilities.schema.json regenerated) · spec/v2/core/interrupt.md §Tokens (one bullet: the facet's normative-home naming) · SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md (one row) · api/seams-v2.yaml + scripts/derive-v2-api.py (new seam readInterruptToken) · conformance: new scenario v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts · CHANGELOG. subject.schema.json is NOT changed. v1 is frozen and not touched.
Compatibilityadditive per COMPATIBILITY.md §2.1 / §2.4 (an optional property on a closed v2 object; an optional facet boolean; a new seam). §A.1 states, for one resolve surface, what identity.md §2.1 already requires of every lane.
Supersedes—
Superseded by—

Summary

A resolution through resolveInterruptByToken proves possession of a resume token, not identity. v2's interrupt.resolved has one identity seat, resolvedBy, a closed Subject that no token presentation fits honestly, so a host records nothing and a consumer cannot tell "resolved by an approval link" from "resolver unknown". This RFC adds resolvedVia — the instrument (scheme: "interrupt-token"), an optional opaque tokenRef, and an optional host-attested boundTo Subject — as a separate axis from resolvedBy, and states that resolvedBy never names a Subject the request did not authenticate. A facet boolean, interrupt.resolvedVia, gates the positive recording obligation; a new test seam lets the suite read a resume token so the rules can be witnessed.

Motivation

The gap

  • $defs/interruptResolved.resolvedBy is $ref subject.schema.json (run-event-payloads.schema.json). The Subject is closed: kind ∈ {user, agent, anonymous, workload}, a lane from ten authentication lanes, issuer/subjectId/tenant REQUIRED (spec/v2/core/identity.md §1.1).
  • A token presentation is none of those. The token is minted by the host at suspension (identity.md §4; interrupt.md §Tokens) and is the authorization (interrupt.md §Resolve surfaces: "Auth: the token"). Recording any Subject in resolvedBy for it would assert an identity nobody authenticated; recording anonymous would be false too (an approval link is usually addressed to a known person).
  • So a conformant host records no resolvedBy on a token resolution. A consumer reading the log sees the same absence for "an emailed approval link was used" as for "a host that does not record resolvers".

Who hits it

  • openwop-app resolves through a bare token on three surfaces (POST /v1/interrupts/{token}, the decide-by-email confirm form, an internal helper) and records no resolvedBy there by design (its ADR 0932 D2, ADR 1040 D6). The emailed links already carry a host MAC over (token, voter) (its ADR 0478 / 0899), so the host knows whom it addressed the link to and has nowhere to say so.
  • Book AI, an openwop-app tenant product, applies an AI-drafted change only when the approval of record maps to the book's owner or a co-author. It reads the gate's latest interrupt.resolved and requires resolvedBy.kind === "user", no actor, a person lane, the run tenant, and a subjectId it matches forward. A share-link approval carries no resolvedBy, so it falls back to a receipt Book AI writes only on its own route, and an approval made through the host's link fails to apply. Book AI's stated requirement (2026-11-04): accept a link approval only under a host-attested binding to a full user Subject; the minter does not count ("sharing isn't approving"); an unbound link is refused; keep the token off the record. Book AI later narrowed this (2026-11-09): it applies a change only on a signed-in resolvedBy and treats resolvedVia as audit, not approval. The motivation stands: a consumer still cannot tell a link resolution from an unrecorded one without this RFC.

Why the spec

The record is the wire event. Two hosts that each invent a vendor key under the RFC 0185 hatch (openwop-…) give a consumer two shapes, and a hatch member "MUST NOT be interpreted" (RFC 0185 §C), so no consumer may build on it. The distinction between authenticated by and presented is an identity rule (identity.md §2.1: bind to the verified identity, "never to an asserted header"), and it belongs where that rule lives.

Proposal

§A. Normative rules

Homes (the v2 core is at its word budget, scripts/check-core-budget.mjs, so the rules live in schema descriptions, as RFC 0257's do): §A.1 in $defs/interruptResolved.resolvedBy.description; §A.2–§A.5 in $defs/interruptResolved.resolvedVia and its members; the facet rule in spec/v2/facets/interrupt.schema.json resolvedVia.

§A.1 — resolvedBy names only an authenticated Subject. (Unconditional.) resolvedBy names only a Subject the resolving request authenticated on a lane (identity.md §2.1). A host MUST NOT record in resolvedBy a Subject that the request merely presented a resume token for, named in its body (for example a voter), or was addressed by. When nothing authenticated, resolvedBy is absent. An authenticated caller that also presents a token (for example an API key on the run-scoped surface) is still recorded: it authenticated.

§A.2 — resolvedVia records the instrument. resolvedVia is OPTIONAL and closed, with scheme REQUIRED.

  • A host advertising interrupt.resolvedVia: true MUST record resolvedVia with scheme: "interrupt-token" on every resolution through resolveInterruptByToken or any host surface that presents that interrupt's resume token.
  • A host MUST NOT record resolvedVia on a resolution that presented no resume token (a run-scoped resolution with no token, a timer, a host-internal resume).
  • scheme is a closed vocabulary that grows under overview.md §0; a consumer MUST NOT act on a member it does not recognize. interrupt-token is the only member at this RFC.

§A.3 — tokenRef is a reference, never token material. OPTIONAL. For a host that issues distinct tokens per recipient, so that two presentations can be told apart. It MUST NOT equal or contain the token or any of its segments, and MUST NOT be computable from the token without a host-held secret — a bare digest of the token, truncated or not, is forbidden, because the event log would otherwise be an oracle confirming a leaked token. It SHOULD be minted independently and stored with the token. Grammar ^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{16,128}$. A host that issues one token per interrupt gains nothing from it and SHOULD omit it.

§A.4 — boundTo is host-attested attribution. OPTIONAL. A Subject of kind user or agent, never with the legacy issuer.

  • What the host attests. A host MUST set boundTo only when both hold: (a) the host itself issued this link to that Subject — for example the approval email it sent to that person — and never for a link a member generated, copied or pasted; and (b) on this request it verified its own MAC, under a key it holds, over the token and that Subject. It MUST NOT set boundTo from a name it did not bind (a body voter with no host binding is not one).
  • Lifetime and use. A host that sets boundTo MUST honour the token's expiresAt and its invalidation on resolution (interrupt.md §Tokens), and MUST count at most one vote per boundTo for one interrupt, so a bound link decides or votes once.
  • Window. mintedAt (when the token was issued) and expiresAt (its expiresAt) are OPTIONAL date-times on resolvedVia; a host SHOULD record both with boundTo, so a consumer can refuse a link older than its own window.
  • boundTo MUST be built with the mapping the host uses for owner.subject for that person, with tenant equal to the run tenant, so a consumer can compare it with the Subjects it already knows.
  • boundTo is attribution, not authentication: a bound link can be forwarded. A consumer that treats a bound link as that person's decision makes a policy choice the record states plainly.
  • boundTo.actor keeps RFC 0170 §A.2's meaning: present only when a host delegation record attests that the bound Subject acted for another.
  • Eligibility. When the interrupt declares eligibility (interrupt.md §Approver enforcement: approversList, or group/role refs the host enforces), a host advertising interrupt.resolvedVia MUST carry boundTo on a successful token resolution, or MUST refuse that resolution. §Approver enforcement already obliges the host to refuse a resolver not in the list, so it has to have identified one; this rule makes it say whom.

§A.5 — History. resolvedVia is part of the recorded resolution: replay and forkRun MUST copy it verbatim with the rest of the payload and MUST NOT recompute it (replay.md; eligibility is never re-resolved, interrupt.md §Approver enforcement). Rotating a host secret never rewrites a recorded tokenRef or boundTo.

§B. The facet

spec/v2/facets/interrupt.schema.json (listed in spec/v2/declaration.json interrupt.facets[]; capabilities.schema.json is regenerated, never hand-edited) gains resolvedVia: boolean — "true only if the host records interrupt.resolved.resolvedVia on every token resolution and carries boundTo or refuses a token resolution of an interrupt that declares eligibility". Absent ⇒ false. §A.1 does not depend on it.

§C. The seam

§C.1 api/seams-v2.yaml gains POST /conformance/seams/sample/interrupts/token (readInterruptToken), derived from scripts/derive-v2-api.py: body { runId, nodeId, bind? }; 200 { token, resumeValueMembers? }; 404 when unwired or no open interrupt matches. It returns the token the production path minted for a run the caller created. With bind: true it also returns the members the host's own production binding path would put in a presentation addressed to the caller (for openwop-app, a signed voter), which the suite merges into the resumeValue unchanged. It mints nothing production does not and resolves nothing. It exists because v2 gives an outside party no way to read a resume token (interrupt.md §Resolve surfaces; the signed-token surface is a SHOULD and the suite cannot mint a token — v2-interrupt-resolve-terminal.test.ts).

Wire shape changes

 "interruptResolved": { "properties": {
   "resolvedBy": {
     "$ref": "subject.schema.json",
-    "description": "v1 interrupt.md MUST … carried into v2 as the resolving Subject."
+    "description": "… RFC 0259 §A.1: it names only a Subject the resolving request authenticated on a lane …"
   },
+  "resolvedVia": {
+    "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["scheme"],
+    "properties": {
+      "scheme":   { "type": "string", "enum": ["interrupt-token"] },
+      "tokenRef": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{16,128}$" },
+      "boundTo":  { "allOf": [ { "$ref": "subject.schema.json" },
+                    { "properties": { "kind": { "enum": ["user", "agent"] },
+                                      "issuer": { "not": { "const": "urn:openwop:legacy" } } } } ] },
+      "mintedAt":  { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
+      "expiresAt": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }
+    }
+  },
 spec/v2/facets/interrupt.schema.json "properties": {
+  "resolvedVia": { "type": "boolean" },

Examples

Positive — an emailed approval link the host addressed to Ana, resolved without a session (synthetic values):

{ "nodeId": "gate", "interruptId": "acme/0123456789abcdef", "kind": "approval",
  "decision": "granted", "action": "accept",
  "resolvedVia": { "scheme": "interrupt-token",
    "boundTo": { "issuer": "urn:example:session", "subjectId": "u_7f3a9c1e", "tenant": "acme", "lane": "session", "kind": "user" },
    "mintedAt": "2026-11-04T09:00:00Z", "expiresAt": "2026-11-04T09:30:00Z" } }

Positive — an open link nobody was bound to: "resolvedVia": { "scheme": "interrupt-token" }, no resolvedBy.

Positive — an API-key caller on the run-scoped surface: resolvedBy is its workload Subject; no resolvedVia (no token presented).

Negative — each fails validation: "resolvedVia": {} (no scheme); { "scheme": "share-link" }; { "scheme": "interrupt-token", "token": "…" } (closed); a tokenRef of "ow2.hs256.k.p.m" (grammar); a boundTo of kind anonymous or workload, or with issuer urn:openwop:legacy.

Negative — valid JSON, forbidden by §A.1: "resolvedBy": { …kind:"user"… } on an unauthenticated POST /interrupts/{token} whose body named voter: "ana".

Security considerations

  • No token on the record. §A.3 forbids the token, its segments and any bare digest; the suite checks all three (§Conformance leg 4). tokenRef is optional, so the default is to carry nothing derived from the token at all.
  • Attribution is not authentication — the residual risk, stated. A bound link is a bearer credential addressed to one person. Anyone that person forwards it to, and anyone who reads their mailbox, can use it, and the record will still name the addressee. §A.4 narrows the window (host-issued links only, expiry and single vote honoured, mintedAt/expiresAt on the record so a consumer can apply a shorter window of its own) but cannot close it: closing it needs the person to authenticate, which is the run-scoped surface. A consumer that treats boundTo as that person's decision accepts this residual risk, and the normative text says so rather than implying a login. Book AI declines it (decided 2026-11-09): it applies a change only on a signed-in resolvedBy, and reads resolvedVia for audit.
  • No identity laundering. §A.1 closes the obvious misuse — copying a body voter into resolvedBy — on every host, advertised or not.
  • Threat model. SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §4.1 gains a row: a resume token, a segment or a digest of it on interrupt.resolved would let the log confirm a leaked token; §A.3 and leg 4 are the mitigation.
  • Privacy. boundTo is a person's Subject, as resolvedBy already is; it adds no new PII class. Subject erasure works by unlinking at the identity record, never by rewriting the event log (replay.md: history is fixed). The subjectId grammar already forbids PII (ids.schema.json#/$defs/subjectId).
  • Cross-tenant. boundTo.tenant MUST equal the run tenant; a tokenRef minted per token is not linkable across tenants.
  • No new invariant row: §A.1 and §A.3 are witnessed by the scenario; registering them in SECURITY/invariants.yaml waits on a host witness (RFC 0167 §C rule: not before the tests run green somewhere).

Open spec gaps (what this RFC does not cover)

#GapWhy not here
1Instruments other than an interrupt token — an MCP requestState resume, an inbound-webhook resumeEach needs its own scheme member and its own binding story; §A.2 grows under §0 when one is specified.
2Who minted or shared a link (mintedBy)A host-minted resume token carries the gate's eligibility policy, not a person's authority; naming the run owner would attribute authority falsely, and the one consumer says the minter does not count. Additive later for a host that mints per-person delegated links.
3A per-recipient token schemetokenRef is the seat; issuing distinct tokens is a host choice this RFC does not require.
4A v1 projectionv1 is frozen and end-of-support (RFC 0234). A host still serving major 1 carries the member on the open v1 def as an extra key or omits it.

Compatibility

additive (COMPATIBILITY.md §2.1, §2.4):

  • resolvedVia is a new OPTIONAL property on the closed interruptResolved; no field is added to required, none is retyped, none removed. Existing producers do not emit it; existing consumers ignore it or, on the closed def, now accept it. check-v2-surface-monotone.mjs passes: additions only.
  • interrupt.resolvedVia is a new OPTIONAL facet boolean; absent ⇒ false. No host's current advertisement changes meaning.
  • The seam is new, test-only, and gated on the seams profile.
  • §A.1 tightens nothing a conformant host does: identity.md §2.1 already forbids binding to an asserted identity, and no interruptResolved.resolvedBy emitted from an unauthenticated token presentation can be an authenticated Subject. A host that copies a body voter into resolvedBy today violates §2.1 already; §A.1 makes the case explicit and witnessable.
  • subject.schema.json is untouched, so owner.subject, run.started.owner, the actor chain and SubjectLink are unaffected. This is the point of choosing a sibling property (§Alternatives 1).
  • A consumer that switches on resolvedBy is unaffected by an unbound token resolution: resolvedBy stays absent, as today. Book AI's receipt fallback keeps working; it reads resolvedVia for audit only.

Conformance

Existing coverage

  • owner-subject-shape.test.ts — the Subject; unchanged.
  • v2-approval-reject-disposition.test.ts leg 9 — a fork copies the recorded resolution (decision/action/reason/resolvedBy); the rule §A.5 restates.
  • v2-interrupt-token-scheme.test.ts, interrupt-token-matrix.test.ts — the token grammar and lifecycle; unchanged.

New scenario (planned): v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts

LegRequirement idGate
1openwop.requirement.0259.shapenone — server-free
2openwop.requirement.0259.token-resolve-names-no-subjectfixture conformance-approval + seams profile + readInterruptToken
3openwop.requirement.0259.resolved-via-recordedas 2 + interrupt.resolvedVia: true
4openwop.requirement.0259.token-ref-opaqueas 3 + a tokenRef present
5openwop.requirement.0259.run-resolve-no-viaas 3
6openwop.requirement.0259.bound-to-calleras 3 + the seam returning resumeValueMembers for bind: true
7openwop.requirement.0259.forged-binding-binds-no-oneas 6

Leg 4 refuses a tokenRef that contains the token or any ≥ 8-character segment of it, or that shares an 8-character run with the sha256 of the token or a segment in hex, base64 or base64url — this catches the truncated-digest convention, which a bare "not equal to sha256" check would pass. Leg 7 is the negative: a token bound to the caller (Subject A), presented with that binding altered so it claims someone else (B) — every member the seam returned is changed by one character. The host MUST NOT record boundTo (it may refuse the resolution); attributing the decision to A or to B fails. Leg 6 compares boundTo with the run.started.owner.subject of the run the caller created: a host whose caller is a workload Subject cannot bind (boundTo admits user/agent), returns no members, and records inapplicable.

No new fixture: every leg runs on conformance-approval.

Capability gating

Legs 3–6 gate on the facet; leg 2 does not, because §A.1 is unconditional. All host legs gate on the seams profile, because only the seam yields a token: profile not advertised ⇒ inapplicable; advertised with the seam unwired ⇒ blocked (seamAbsent).

Reference-host coverage and INTEROP-MATRIX

openwop-app implements §A–§B behind a host flag that defaults off (its ADR 1059) and does not advertise interrupt.resolvedVia until this RFC's shape is locked (Active) and vendored. The v2 reference host (openwop-examples) does not yet implement the seam: reference-host implementation is deferred and is the Accepted gate. No INTEROP-MATRIX column: the facet is a family member, not a profile.

Suite vs spec

Leg 4's 8-character-run heuristic is a suite judgement of "computable from the token without a host-held secret", not a spec requirement on its own: it is the probe, and its false-positive rate is stated in the scenario.

Falsifiability — one row per normative requirement

RequirementObservable — what an outside party seesWho can cause the conditionVerdict
§A schema shapevalidation of interruptResolved with and without resolvedVia — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.shapethe suite, unaidedwitnessable — unaided
§A.1 no unauthenticated resolvedByan unauthenticated token resolve logs no resolvedBy — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.token-resolve-names-no-subjectthe suite, given a token from readInterruptTokenseam-gated (readInterruptToken)
§A.2 recorded on a token resolutionresolvedVia.scheme on that event — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.resolved-via-recordedthe suite via the seam, on a host advertising the facetseam-gated (readInterruptToken)
§A.2 absent on a run-scoped resolutionno resolvedVia on that event — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.run-resolve-no-viathe suite, on a host advertising the facetwitnessable — gated (facet; the scenario also requires the seams profile)
§A.3 tokenRef opaquetokenRef vs the token the suite holds — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.token-ref-opaquethe suite via the seamseam-gated (readInterruptToken)
§A.4 boundTo from the host's own binding, owner mappingboundTo equals the caller's owner.subject — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.bound-to-callerthe suite via the seam with bind: trueseam-gated (readInterruptToken)
§A.4 no boundTo from a binding the host did not makean altered binding records no boundTo — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.forged-binding-binds-no-onethe suite via the seam with bind: trueseam-gated (readInterruptToken; host-judged — the suite cannot verify the MAC, only that an altered binding binds no one)
§A.4 host-issued links only; expiry and one vote per boundTo—needs the suite to hold a member-generated link and a second bound vote on a quorum gate the suite can be named inclaims-check — the host states its link issuance; expiry and invalidation are already witnessed by interrupt-token-matrix and v2-interrupt-resolve-terminal
§A.4 eligibility ⇒ boundTo or refusea token resolve of an ACL'd interrupt either carries boundTo or is refusedneeds a fixture whose approversList names the suite's own Subject in the host's ref grammar, which the suite cannot spellunwitnessable — the suite cannot place itself in a host's approver list; Unresolved question 2
§A.5 fork copies verbatima replay fork's interrupt.resolved carries the source's resolvedViathe suite, on a host advertising replay mode replay and the facetwitnessable — gated (no dedicated leg yet; planned beside v2-approval-reject-disposition leg 9)

Alternatives considered

  1. A new Subject kind: "capability" (and lane: "capability") inside resolvedBy. The shape this RFC was filed to propose. Rejected by an independent architect review before drafting: (a) subject.schema.json is the shared $ref of RunSnapshot.owner, run.started.owner and four unrolled actor levels, so every site would need a not kind: capability exclusion, unsafe by default for the next site; (b) capability is not an authentication lane — identity.md §2.1–§2.2 make a lane a binding pipeline advertised in auth.lanes[] with issuers, revocation and assurance, and check-lane-revocation-rules.mjs would need a row with nothing true to say; (c) any value in resolvedBy for a token resolution removes the one consumer's documented fallback (Book AI refuses a present resolvedBy whose kind is not user), turning today's working receipt path into a refusal; (d) a nested interruptId duplicates the event's and diverges on fork, where a host re-mints the id.
  2. A separate capability-subject.schema.json with resolvedBy: anyOf [Subject, CapabilitySubject]. Avoids (a) and (b) but keeps (c), and makes resolvedBy mean two different things.
  3. boundTo as the Subject and the holder as actor. Rejected: RFC 0170 §A.2 makes actor "who acts on this subject's behalf" under a delegation the host attests; a link holder is not attested to be anyone, and Book AI refuses any actor.
  4. A required token-derived subjectId (per-tenant HMAC of the token). Rejected as the default: with one token per interrupt it identifies nothing the interruptId does not, and it adds a key-management obligation. Kept as the optional tokenRef for per-recipient tokens.
  5. Host vendor keys under the RFC 0185 hatch. Rejected: a hatch member MUST NOT be interpreted (RFC 0185 §C), so no consumer could rely on it.
  6. Do nothing. A token resolution stays indistinguishable from an unrecorded one, and Book AI cannot accept approvals made through the host's own links.

Decided questions

Decided 2026-11-08 at Draft → Active:

  1. scheme members for MCP requestState and inbound-webhook resumes. Deferred (Open gap 1): neither presents an interrupt token.
  2. Witnessing §A.4's eligibility rule. Deferred to a seam revision once a host implements the binding.
  3. SECURITY/invariants.yaml rows for §A.1 and §A.3. Not yet: they are registered once a host witnesses them (RFC 0167 §C).
  4. boundTo.lane with no attestable login lane. The owner mapping, as written. A host with none omits boundTo and, under §A.4's eligibility rule, refuses. Revisit if a host finds that too strict.
  5. §A.1: restatement or new obligation. A restatement of identity.md §2.1 ("bind the verified identity to the request, never to an asserted header") for the token surface, so the RFC stays additive. The one host with a signed-voter path already records no resolvedBy on a token resolution (openwop-app ADR 0899, ADR 0932 D2).
  6. §A.4(b), the host's MAC check. Host-judged, as the falsifiability row says. Leg 7 witnesses only that an altered binding binds no one.

Implementation notes (non-normative)

  • openwop-app: the token surfaces call resolveAndResume(…, { capabilityToken: true }). The host work is to record resolvedVia { scheme: "interrupt-token" } there, derive boundTo from a verified (token, voter) MAC (verifyVoterBinding) through the same Subject mapping as the run-owner stamp, omit tokenRef (one token per interrupt), and refuse an unbound token resolution of an ACL'd interrupt when advertising. Behind a host flag defaulting off until this RFC's shape is on main.
  • Book AI (decided 2026-11-09): applies an approved change only when resolvedBy names an owner or co-author on a session, OIDC or SAML lane. It never treats resolvedVia.boundTo as an approver, because a forwarded or scanned link proves who it was sent to, not who used it. It reads resolvedVia for audit.
  • Reference host: the seam is a thin read of the stored token; the recording is one property on the resolve path.

Acceptance criteria

  • [x] Comment window run (Draft → Active; RFC 0147 §A.6). (Waived by the maintainer, 2026-11-08.)
  • [x] Schema updated: interruptResolved.resolvedVia; resolvedBy description; facet boolean via declaration.json; the threat-model row. (2026-11-08, 2.46.44.)
  • [x] Seam added to api/seams-v2.yaml through scripts/derive-v2-api.py. (2026-11-08.)
  • [x] Conformance scenario v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts (one server-free leg, six host legs). (2026-11-08, 2.46.44.)
  • [x] CHANGELOG entry. (2.46.44 release section.)
  • [x] A host implements §A–§C and its bundle records legs 2, 3 and 5 executed-pass (leg 6 where the caller is a person). (2026-11-16: the reference host's certified 2.49.5 cut, build commit:44c4e59.)
  • [x] Register sweep (RFCS/registers/0259-.gaps.md, .risks.md). (2026-11-15: G5 closed; R2 open until a host mints tokenRef)*

References

  • spec/v2/core/identity.md §1.1, §2.1, §4; spec/v2/core/interrupt.md §Resolve surfaces, §Tokens, §Approver enforcement; spec/v2/core/overview.md §0; spec/v2/core/replay.md.
  • RFC 0170 (v2 identity), RFC 0183 (interruptResolved action fidelity), RFC 0185 (extension hatch), RFC 0167 §C, RFC 0234 (v1 end of support), RFC 0257 (normative home in a schema description).
  • openwop-app ADR 0478, 0899 (voter binding), 0932 (resume schema and resolvedBy), 1040 D6 (RESBY-CAP-1).
  • Prior art: OAuth 2.0 bearer tokens (RFC 6750) — possession is authorization, not identity; Google Docs / Notion share links — "anyone with the link" is recorded as anonymous, a named invitee as that person.

Status history

  • 2026-11-04 — Draft.
  • 2026-11-08 — Active (comment window waived); schema, facet, seam, threat-model row and scenario land in 2.46.44.
  • 2026-11-16 — Accepted on the reference host's certified 2.49.5 cut (openwop-host-v2-reference-2.49.5-44c4e59.json).

More proposals.

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