Summary
A resolution through resolveInterruptByToken proves possession of a resume token, not identity. v2's interrupt.resolved has one identity seat, resolvedBy, a closed Subject that no token presentation fits honestly, so a host records nothing and a consumer cannot tell "resolved by an approval link" from "resolver unknown". This RFC adds resolvedVia — the instrument (scheme: "interrupt-token"), an optional opaque tokenRef, and an optional host-attested boundTo Subject — as a separate axis from resolvedBy, and states that resolvedBy never names a Subject the request did not authenticate. A facet boolean, interrupt.resolvedVia, gates the positive recording obligation; a new test seam lets the suite read a resume token so the rules can be witnessed.
Motivation
The gap
$defs/interruptResolved.resolvedByis$ref subject.schema.json(run-event-payloads.schema.json). The Subject is closed:kind ∈ {user, agent, anonymous, workload}, alanefrom ten authentication lanes,issuer/subjectId/tenantREQUIRED (spec/v2/core/identity.md§1.1).- A token presentation is none of those. The token is minted by the host at suspension (
identity.md§4;interrupt.md§Tokens) and is the authorization (interrupt.md§Resolve surfaces: "Auth: the token"). Recording any Subject inresolvedByfor it would assert an identity nobody authenticated; recordinganonymouswould be false too (an approval link is usually addressed to a known person). - So a conformant host records no
resolvedByon a token resolution. A consumer reading the log sees the same absence for "an emailed approval link was used" as for "a host that does not record resolvers".
Who hits it
- openwop-app resolves through a bare token on three surfaces (
POST /v1/interrupts/{token}, the decide-by-email confirm form, an internal helper) and records noresolvedBythere by design (its ADR 0932 D2, ADR 1040 D6). The emailed links already carry a host MAC over(token, voter)(its ADR 0478 / 0899), so the host knows whom it addressed the link to and has nowhere to say so. - Book AI, an openwop-app tenant product, applies an AI-drafted change only when the approval of record maps to the book's owner or a co-author. It reads the gate's latest
interrupt.resolvedand requiresresolvedBy.kind === "user", noactor, a person lane, the run tenant, and asubjectIdit matches forward. A share-link approval carries noresolvedBy, so it falls back to a receipt Book AI writes only on its own route, and an approval made through the host's link fails to apply. Book AI's stated requirement (2026-11-04): accept a link approval only under a host-attested binding to a full user Subject; the minter does not count ("sharing isn't approving"); an unbound link is refused; keep the token off the record. Book AI later narrowed this (2026-11-09): it applies a change only on a signed-inresolvedByand treatsresolvedViaas audit, not approval. The motivation stands: a consumer still cannot tell a link resolution from an unrecorded one without this RFC.
Why the spec
The record is the wire event. Two hosts that each invent a vendor key under the RFC 0185 hatch (openwop-…) give a consumer two shapes, and a hatch member "MUST NOT be interpreted" (RFC 0185 §C), so no consumer may build on it. The distinction between authenticated by and presented is an identity rule (identity.md §2.1: bind to the verified identity, "never to an asserted header"), and it belongs where that rule lives.
Proposal
§A. Normative rules
Homes (the v2 core is at its word budget, scripts/check-core-budget.mjs, so the rules live in schema descriptions, as RFC 0257's do): §A.1 in $defs/interruptResolved.resolvedBy.description; §A.2–§A.5 in $defs/interruptResolved.resolvedVia and its members; the facet rule in spec/v2/facets/interrupt.schema.json resolvedVia.
§A.1 — resolvedBy names only an authenticated Subject. (Unconditional.) resolvedBy names only a Subject the resolving request authenticated on a lane (identity.md §2.1). A host MUST NOT record in resolvedBy a Subject that the request merely presented a resume token for, named in its body (for example a voter), or was addressed by. When nothing authenticated, resolvedBy is absent. An authenticated caller that also presents a token (for example an API key on the run-scoped surface) is still recorded: it authenticated.
§A.2 — resolvedVia records the instrument. resolvedVia is OPTIONAL and closed, with scheme REQUIRED.
- A host advertising
interrupt.resolvedVia: trueMUST recordresolvedViawithscheme: "interrupt-token"on every resolution throughresolveInterruptByTokenor any host surface that presents that interrupt's resume token. - A host MUST NOT record
resolvedViaon a resolution that presented no resume token (a run-scoped resolution with no token, a timer, a host-internal resume). schemeis a closed vocabulary that grows underoverview.md§0; a consumer MUST NOT act on a member it does not recognize.interrupt-tokenis the only member at this RFC.
§A.3 — tokenRef is a reference, never token material. OPTIONAL. For a host that issues distinct tokens per recipient, so that two presentations can be told apart. It MUST NOT equal or contain the token or any of its segments, and MUST NOT be computable from the token without a host-held secret — a bare digest of the token, truncated or not, is forbidden, because the event log would otherwise be an oracle confirming a leaked token. It SHOULD be minted independently and stored with the token. Grammar ^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{16,128}$. A host that issues one token per interrupt gains nothing from it and SHOULD omit it.
§A.4 — boundTo is host-attested attribution. OPTIONAL. A Subject of kind user or agent, never with the legacy issuer.
- What the host attests. A host MUST set
boundToonly when both hold: (a) the host itself issued this link to that Subject — for example the approval email it sent to that person — and never for a link a member generated, copied or pasted; and (b) on this request it verified its own MAC, under a key it holds, over the token and that Subject. It MUST NOT setboundTofrom a name it did not bind (a bodyvoterwith no host binding is not one). - Lifetime and use. A host that sets
boundToMUST honour the token'sexpiresAtand its invalidation on resolution (interrupt.md§Tokens), and MUST count at most one vote perboundTofor one interrupt, so a bound link decides or votes once. - Window.
mintedAt(when the token was issued) andexpiresAt(itsexpiresAt) are OPTIONAL date-times onresolvedVia; a host SHOULD record both withboundTo, so a consumer can refuse a link older than its own window. boundToMUST be built with the mapping the host uses forowner.subjectfor that person, withtenantequal to the run tenant, so a consumer can compare it with the Subjects it already knows.boundTois attribution, not authentication: a bound link can be forwarded. A consumer that treats a bound link as that person's decision makes a policy choice the record states plainly.boundTo.actorkeeps RFC 0170 §A.2's meaning: present only when a host delegation record attests that the bound Subject acted for another.- Eligibility. When the interrupt declares eligibility (
interrupt.md§Approver enforcement:approversList, or group/role refs the host enforces), a host advertisinginterrupt.resolvedViaMUST carryboundToon a successful token resolution, or MUST refuse that resolution. §Approver enforcement already obliges the host to refuse a resolver not in the list, so it has to have identified one; this rule makes it say whom.
§A.5 — History. resolvedVia is part of the recorded resolution: replay and forkRun MUST copy it verbatim with the rest of the payload and MUST NOT recompute it (replay.md; eligibility is never re-resolved, interrupt.md §Approver enforcement). Rotating a host secret never rewrites a recorded tokenRef or boundTo.
§B. The facet
spec/v2/facets/interrupt.schema.json (listed in spec/v2/declaration.json interrupt.facets[]; capabilities.schema.json is regenerated, never hand-edited) gains resolvedVia: boolean — "true only if the host records interrupt.resolved.resolvedVia on every token resolution and carries boundTo or refuses a token resolution of an interrupt that declares eligibility". Absent ⇒ false. §A.1 does not depend on it.
§C. The seam
§C.1 api/seams-v2.yaml gains POST /conformance/seams/sample/interrupts/token (readInterruptToken), derived from scripts/derive-v2-api.py: body { runId, nodeId, bind? }; 200 { token, resumeValueMembers? }; 404 when unwired or no open interrupt matches. It returns the token the production path minted for a run the caller created. With bind: true it also returns the members the host's own production binding path would put in a presentation addressed to the caller (for openwop-app, a signed voter), which the suite merges into the resumeValue unchanged. It mints nothing production does not and resolves nothing. It exists because v2 gives an outside party no way to read a resume token (interrupt.md §Resolve surfaces; the signed-token surface is a SHOULD and the suite cannot mint a token — v2-interrupt-resolve-terminal.test.ts).
Wire shape changes
"interruptResolved": { "properties": {
"resolvedBy": {
"$ref": "subject.schema.json",
- "description": "v1 interrupt.md MUST … carried into v2 as the resolving Subject."
+ "description": "… RFC 0259 §A.1: it names only a Subject the resolving request authenticated on a lane …"
},
+ "resolvedVia": {
+ "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false, "required": ["scheme"],
+ "properties": {
+ "scheme": { "type": "string", "enum": ["interrupt-token"] },
+ "tokenRef": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{16,128}$" },
+ "boundTo": { "allOf": [ { "$ref": "subject.schema.json" },
+ { "properties": { "kind": { "enum": ["user", "agent"] },
+ "issuer": { "not": { "const": "urn:openwop:legacy" } } } } ] },
+ "mintedAt": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
+ "expiresAt": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }
+ }
+ },
spec/v2/facets/interrupt.schema.json "properties": {
+ "resolvedVia": { "type": "boolean" },
Examples
Positive — an emailed approval link the host addressed to Ana, resolved without a session (synthetic values):
{ "nodeId": "gate", "interruptId": "acme/0123456789abcdef", "kind": "approval",
"decision": "granted", "action": "accept",
"resolvedVia": { "scheme": "interrupt-token",
"boundTo": { "issuer": "urn:example:session", "subjectId": "u_7f3a9c1e", "tenant": "acme", "lane": "session", "kind": "user" },
"mintedAt": "2026-11-04T09:00:00Z", "expiresAt": "2026-11-04T09:30:00Z" } }
Positive — an open link nobody was bound to: "resolvedVia": { "scheme": "interrupt-token" }, no resolvedBy.
Positive — an API-key caller on the run-scoped surface: resolvedBy is its workload Subject; no resolvedVia (no token presented).
Negative — each fails validation: "resolvedVia": {} (no scheme); { "scheme": "share-link" }; { "scheme": "interrupt-token", "token": "…" } (closed); a tokenRef of "ow2.hs256.k.p.m" (grammar); a boundTo of kind anonymous or workload, or with issuer urn:openwop:legacy.
Negative — valid JSON, forbidden by §A.1: "resolvedBy": { …kind:"user"… } on an unauthenticated POST /interrupts/{token} whose body named voter: "ana".
Security considerations
- No token on the record. §A.3 forbids the token, its segments and any bare digest; the suite checks all three (§Conformance leg 4).
tokenRefis optional, so the default is to carry nothing derived from the token at all. - Attribution is not authentication — the residual risk, stated. A bound link is a bearer credential addressed to one person. Anyone that person forwards it to, and anyone who reads their mailbox, can use it, and the record will still name the addressee. §A.4 narrows the window (host-issued links only, expiry and single vote honoured,
mintedAt/expiresAton the record so a consumer can apply a shorter window of its own) but cannot close it: closing it needs the person to authenticate, which is the run-scoped surface. A consumer that treatsboundToas that person's decision accepts this residual risk, and the normative text says so rather than implying a login. Book AI declines it (decided 2026-11-09): it applies a change only on a signed-inresolvedBy, and readsresolvedViafor audit. - No identity laundering. §A.1 closes the obvious misuse — copying a body
voterintoresolvedBy— on every host, advertised or not. - Threat model.
SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md§4.1 gains a row: a resume token, a segment or a digest of it oninterrupt.resolvedwould let the log confirm a leaked token; §A.3 and leg 4 are the mitigation. - Privacy.
boundTois a person's Subject, asresolvedByalready is; it adds no new PII class. Subject erasure works by unlinking at the identity record, never by rewriting the event log (replay.md: history is fixed). ThesubjectIdgrammar already forbids PII (ids.schema.json#/$defs/subjectId). - Cross-tenant.
boundTo.tenantMUST equal the run tenant; atokenRefminted per token is not linkable across tenants. - No new invariant row: §A.1 and §A.3 are witnessed by the scenario; registering them in
SECURITY/invariants.yamlwaits on a host witness (RFC 0167 §C rule: not before the tests run green somewhere).
Open spec gaps (what this RFC does not cover)
| # | Gap | Why not here |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Instruments other than an interrupt token — an MCP requestState resume, an inbound-webhook resume | Each needs its own scheme member and its own binding story; §A.2 grows under §0 when one is specified. |
| 2 | Who minted or shared a link (mintedBy) | A host-minted resume token carries the gate's eligibility policy, not a person's authority; naming the run owner would attribute authority falsely, and the one consumer says the minter does not count. Additive later for a host that mints per-person delegated links. |
| 3 | A per-recipient token scheme | tokenRef is the seat; issuing distinct tokens is a host choice this RFC does not require. |
| 4 | A v1 projection | v1 is frozen and end-of-support (RFC 0234). A host still serving major 1 carries the member on the open v1 def as an extra key or omits it. |
Compatibility
additive (COMPATIBILITY.md §2.1, §2.4):
resolvedViais a new OPTIONAL property on the closedinterruptResolved; no field is added torequired, none is retyped, none removed. Existing producers do not emit it; existing consumers ignore it or, on the closed def, now accept it.check-v2-surface-monotone.mjspasses: additions only.interrupt.resolvedViais a new OPTIONAL facet boolean; absent ⇒ false. No host's current advertisement changes meaning.- The seam is new, test-only, and gated on the seams profile.
- §A.1 tightens nothing a conformant host does:
identity.md§2.1 already forbids binding to an asserted identity, and nointerruptResolved.resolvedByemitted from an unauthenticated token presentation can be an authenticated Subject. A host that copies a bodyvoterintoresolvedBytoday violates §2.1 already; §A.1 makes the case explicit and witnessable. subject.schema.jsonis untouched, soowner.subject,run.started.owner, theactorchain andSubjectLinkare unaffected. This is the point of choosing a sibling property (§Alternatives 1).- A consumer that switches on
resolvedByis unaffected by an unbound token resolution:resolvedBystays absent, as today. Book AI's receipt fallback keeps working; it readsresolvedViafor audit only.
Conformance
Existing coverage
owner-subject-shape.test.ts— the Subject; unchanged.v2-approval-reject-disposition.test.tsleg 9 — a fork copies the recorded resolution (decision/action/reason/resolvedBy); the rule §A.5 restates.v2-interrupt-token-scheme.test.ts,interrupt-token-matrix.test.ts— the token grammar and lifecycle; unchanged.
New scenario (planned): v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts
| Leg | Requirement id | Gate |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | openwop.requirement.0259.shape | none — server-free |
| 2 | openwop.requirement.0259.token-resolve-names-no-subject | fixture conformance-approval + seams profile + readInterruptToken |
| 3 | openwop.requirement.0259.resolved-via-recorded | as 2 + interrupt.resolvedVia: true |
| 4 | openwop.requirement.0259.token-ref-opaque | as 3 + a tokenRef present |
| 5 | openwop.requirement.0259.run-resolve-no-via | as 3 |
| 6 | openwop.requirement.0259.bound-to-caller | as 3 + the seam returning resumeValueMembers for bind: true |
| 7 | openwop.requirement.0259.forged-binding-binds-no-one | as 6 |
Leg 4 refuses a tokenRef that contains the token or any ≥ 8-character segment of it, or that shares an 8-character run with the sha256 of the token or a segment in hex, base64 or base64url — this catches the truncated-digest convention, which a bare "not equal to sha256" check would pass. Leg 7 is the negative: a token bound to the caller (Subject A), presented with that binding altered so it claims someone else (B) — every member the seam returned is changed by one character. The host MUST NOT record boundTo (it may refuse the resolution); attributing the decision to A or to B fails. Leg 6 compares boundTo with the run.started.owner.subject of the run the caller created: a host whose caller is a workload Subject cannot bind (boundTo admits user/agent), returns no members, and records inapplicable.
No new fixture: every leg runs on conformance-approval.
Capability gating
Legs 3–6 gate on the facet; leg 2 does not, because §A.1 is unconditional. All host legs gate on the seams profile, because only the seam yields a token: profile not advertised ⇒ inapplicable; advertised with the seam unwired ⇒ blocked (seamAbsent).
Reference-host coverage and INTEROP-MATRIX
openwop-app implements §A–§B behind a host flag that defaults off (its ADR 1059) and does not advertise interrupt.resolvedVia until this RFC's shape is locked (Active) and vendored. The v2 reference host (openwop-examples) does not yet implement the seam: reference-host implementation is deferred and is the Accepted gate. No INTEROP-MATRIX column: the facet is a family member, not a profile.
Suite vs spec
Leg 4's 8-character-run heuristic is a suite judgement of "computable from the token without a host-held secret", not a spec requirement on its own: it is the probe, and its false-positive rate is stated in the scenario.
Falsifiability — one row per normative requirement
| Requirement | Observable — what an outside party sees | Who can cause the condition | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| §A schema shape | validation of interruptResolved with and without resolvedVia — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.shape | the suite, unaided | witnessable — unaided |
§A.1 no unauthenticated resolvedBy | an unauthenticated token resolve logs no resolvedBy — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.token-resolve-names-no-subject | the suite, given a token from readInterruptToken | seam-gated (readInterruptToken) |
| §A.2 recorded on a token resolution | resolvedVia.scheme on that event — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.resolved-via-recorded | the suite via the seam, on a host advertising the facet | seam-gated (readInterruptToken) |
| §A.2 absent on a run-scoped resolution | no resolvedVia on that event — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.run-resolve-no-via | the suite, on a host advertising the facet | witnessable — gated (facet; the scenario also requires the seams profile) |
§A.3 tokenRef opaque | tokenRef vs the token the suite holds — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.token-ref-opaque | the suite via the seam | seam-gated (readInterruptToken) |
§A.4 boundTo from the host's own binding, owner mapping | boundTo equals the caller's owner.subject — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.bound-to-caller | the suite via the seam with bind: true | seam-gated (readInterruptToken) |
§A.4 no boundTo from a binding the host did not make | an altered binding records no boundTo — v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts, openwop.requirement.0259.forged-binding-binds-no-one | the suite via the seam with bind: true | seam-gated (readInterruptToken; host-judged — the suite cannot verify the MAC, only that an altered binding binds no one) |
§A.4 host-issued links only; expiry and one vote per boundTo | — | needs the suite to hold a member-generated link and a second bound vote on a quorum gate the suite can be named in | claims-check — the host states its link issuance; expiry and invalidation are already witnessed by interrupt-token-matrix and v2-interrupt-resolve-terminal |
§A.4 eligibility ⇒ boundTo or refuse | a token resolve of an ACL'd interrupt either carries boundTo or is refused | needs a fixture whose approversList names the suite's own Subject in the host's ref grammar, which the suite cannot spell | unwitnessable — the suite cannot place itself in a host's approver list; Unresolved question 2 |
| §A.5 fork copies verbatim | a replay fork's interrupt.resolved carries the source's resolvedVia | the suite, on a host advertising replay mode replay and the facet | witnessable — gated (no dedicated leg yet; planned beside v2-approval-reject-disposition leg 9) |
Alternatives considered
- A new Subject
kind: "capability"(andlane: "capability") insideresolvedBy. The shape this RFC was filed to propose. Rejected by an independent architect review before drafting: (a)subject.schema.jsonis the shared$refofRunSnapshot.owner,run.started.ownerand four unrolledactorlevels, so every site would need anot kind: capabilityexclusion, unsafe by default for the next site; (b)capabilityis not an authentication lane —identity.md§2.1–§2.2 make a lane a binding pipeline advertised inauth.lanes[]with issuers, revocation and assurance, andcheck-lane-revocation-rules.mjswould need a row with nothing true to say; (c) any value inresolvedByfor a token resolution removes the one consumer's documented fallback (Book AI refuses a presentresolvedBywhose kind is notuser), turning today's working receipt path into a refusal; (d) a nestedinterruptIdduplicates the event's and diverges on fork, where a host re-mints the id. - A separate
capability-subject.schema.jsonwithresolvedBy: anyOf [Subject, CapabilitySubject]. Avoids (a) and (b) but keeps (c), and makesresolvedBymean two different things. boundToas the Subject and the holder asactor. Rejected: RFC 0170 §A.2 makesactor"who acts on this subject's behalf" under a delegation the host attests; a link holder is not attested to be anyone, and Book AI refuses anyactor.- A required token-derived
subjectId(per-tenant HMAC of the token). Rejected as the default: with one token per interrupt it identifies nothing theinterruptIddoes not, and it adds a key-management obligation. Kept as the optionaltokenReffor per-recipient tokens. - Host vendor keys under the RFC 0185 hatch. Rejected: a hatch member MUST NOT be interpreted (RFC 0185 §C), so no consumer could rely on it.
- Do nothing. A token resolution stays indistinguishable from an unrecorded one, and Book AI cannot accept approvals made through the host's own links.
Decided questions
Decided 2026-11-08 at Draft → Active:
schememembers for MCPrequestStateand inbound-webhook resumes. Deferred (Open gap 1): neither presents an interrupt token.- Witnessing §A.4's eligibility rule. Deferred to a seam revision once a host implements the binding.
SECURITY/invariants.yamlrows for §A.1 and §A.3. Not yet: they are registered once a host witnesses them (RFC 0167 §C).boundTo.lanewith no attestable login lane. The owner mapping, as written. A host with none omitsboundToand, under §A.4's eligibility rule, refuses. Revisit if a host finds that too strict.- §A.1: restatement or new obligation. A restatement of
identity.md§2.1 ("bind the verified identity to the request, never to an asserted header") for the token surface, so the RFC staysadditive. The one host with a signed-voter path already records noresolvedByon a token resolution (openwop-app ADR 0899, ADR 0932 D2). - §A.4(b), the host's MAC check. Host-judged, as the falsifiability row says. Leg 7 witnesses only that an altered binding binds no one.
Implementation notes (non-normative)
- openwop-app: the token surfaces call
resolveAndResume(…, { capabilityToken: true }). The host work is to recordresolvedVia { scheme: "interrupt-token" }there, deriveboundTofrom a verified(token, voter)MAC (verifyVoterBinding) through the same Subject mapping as the run-owner stamp, omittokenRef(one token per interrupt), and refuse an unbound token resolution of an ACL'd interrupt when advertising. Behind a host flag defaulting off until this RFC's shape is onmain. - Book AI (decided 2026-11-09): applies an approved change only when
resolvedBynames an owner or co-author on a session, OIDC or SAML lane. It never treatsresolvedVia.boundToas an approver, because a forwarded or scanned link proves who it was sent to, not who used it. It readsresolvedViafor audit. - Reference host: the seam is a thin read of the stored token; the recording is one property on the resolve path.
Acceptance criteria
- [x] Comment window run (
Draft → Active; RFC 0147 §A.6). (Waived by the maintainer, 2026-11-08.) - [x] Schema updated:
interruptResolved.resolvedVia;resolvedBydescription; facet boolean viadeclaration.json; the threat-model row. (2026-11-08, 2.46.44.) - [x] Seam added to
api/seams-v2.yamlthroughscripts/derive-v2-api.py. (2026-11-08.) - [x] Conformance scenario
v2-interrupt-resolved-via.test.ts(one server-free leg, six host legs). (2026-11-08, 2.46.44.)
- [x] CHANGELOG entry. (2.46.44 release section.)
- [x] A host implements §A–§C and its bundle records legs 2, 3 and 5
executed-pass(leg 6 where the caller is a person). (2026-11-16: the reference host's certified 2.49.5 cut, buildcommit:44c4e59.) - [x] Register sweep (
RFCS/registers/0259-.gaps.md,.risks.md). (2026-11-15: G5 closed; R2 open until a host mintstokenRef)*
References
spec/v2/core/identity.md§1.1, §2.1, §4;spec/v2/core/interrupt.md§Resolve surfaces, §Tokens, §Approver enforcement;spec/v2/core/overview.md§0;spec/v2/core/replay.md.- RFC 0170 (v2 identity), RFC 0183 (
interruptResolvedaction fidelity), RFC 0185 (extension hatch), RFC 0167 §C, RFC 0234 (v1 end of support), RFC 0257 (normative home in a schema description). - openwop-app ADR 0478, 0899 (voter binding), 0932 (resume schema and
resolvedBy), 1040 D6 (RESBY-CAP-1). - Prior art: OAuth 2.0 bearer tokens (RFC 6750) — possession is authorization, not identity; Google Docs / Notion share links — "anyone with the link" is recorded as anonymous, a named invitee as that person.
Status history
- 2026-11-04 — Draft.
- 2026-11-08 — Active (comment window waived); schema, facet, seam, threat-model row and scenario land in 2.46.44.
- 2026-11-16 — Accepted on the reference host's certified 2.49.5 cut (
openwop-host-v2-reference-2.49.5-44c4e59.json).