OpenWOP openwop.dev

Status: Stable · v1.1 (2026-05-12). Non-normative — this document doesn't constrain any conforming openwop implementation. The few MUST / SHOULD keywords in this file are advisory to operators evaluating openwop in a regulated deployment, NOT requirements on conforming hosts; the protocol-level conformance contract lives in spec/v1/*.md + RFCS/ + the conformance suite. Maps openwop's existing protocol-level guarantees onto common compliance vocabularies (SOC 2, GDPR, HIPAA, ISO 27001) so operators have a shared reference. See auth.md for the status legend.


Why this exists

Operators in regulated industries (financial services, healthcare, public sector, EU-resident services) evaluate every infrastructure choice through compliance lenses. "Does openwop support audit-log retention?" is the wrong question — openwop is a protocol, not a deployed service. The right question: "What guarantees does the protocol surface, and which compliance controls do those guarantees satisfy when an operator runs a host that passes the openwop conformance suite inside their certified perimeter?"

This document maps protocol-level surfaces onto common control vocabularies. It does NOT prescribe certification (certification is the deployer's responsibility) and does NOT make legal claims about regulatory adequacy (compliance is a context-specific judgment that requires a qualified auditor + counsel). It does describe what the protocol gives an operator to work with.


Scope and non-claims

In scope:

  • Mapping protocol-level guarantees (in auth.md, auth-profiles.md, replay.md, webhooks.md, observability.md, production-profile.md, SECURITY/) onto control families in SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria, GDPR articles, HIPAA Security Rule safeguards, and ISO 27001:2022 Annex A.
  • Identifying which protocol surfaces an auditor would inspect to verify a given control.

Out of scope:

  • Deployment-specific posture (key management, employee access, physical security, data-residency arrangements). These are the operator's responsibility.
  • Certification or attestation. The protocol can be used inside a certified environment; the protocol itself is not certified.
  • Legal advice. This document is technical reference, not regulatory guidance.

Non-claims:

  • openwop does NOT claim to be "SOC 2 compliant," "HIPAA compliant," or "GDPR compliant." A protocol cannot hold those certifications. Deployments hold them; the protocol is one input.
  • Operators MUST consult qualified legal and compliance professionals before claiming any regulatory status based on protocol surfaces.

Trust Services Criteria (SOC 2)

CriterionProtocol surfaceInspection target
CC6.1 — Logical access controlsauth.md §Bearer tokens + scopes; auth-profiles.md §OAuth2-CC / OIDC / mTLSAuditor inspects: /.well-known/openwop auth.profiles[] advertisement, scope vocabulary, scope-to-route mapping table in rest-endpoints.md.
CC6.6 — Boundary protectionsauth.md §Tenant isolation; agent-memory.md §CTI-1 cross-tenant invariantAuditor inspects: tenant scoping on RunOptions, cross-tenant memory probe scenario agentMemoryCrossTenantIsolation.test.ts.
CC6.7 — Data classification + handlingSECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §SR-1; observability.md §Redaction; auth-profiles.md §openwop-audit-log-integrityAuditor inspects: redaction.test.ts / redactionAdversarial.test.ts / byok-roundtrip.test.ts; canary leak detector in lib/canaries.ts.
CC7.1 — System operations monitoringobservability.md §Spans + metrics; production-profile.md §ObservabilityAuditor inspects: OTel span/metric vocabulary, otel-emission.test.ts, host-emitted span attributes per openwop.* namespace.
CC7.2 — Anomaly detectionauth-profiles.md §openwop-audit-log-integrity §4 verification endpointAuditor inspects: audit-log-integrity.test.ts, /v1/audit/verify chain re-walk + checkpoint signature verification.
CC7.3 — Evaluation of security eventswebhooks.md §HMAC signing + replay-attack-resistant verificationAuditor inspects: webhook signing recipe + circuit-breaker semantics.
A1.2 — Availabilityproduction-profile.md §Backpressure + §Event retention; idempotency.mdAuditor inspects: backpressure 503 envelope + Retry-After bound (≤24h per RFC 0009 Q#2 resolution), event-retention minimum (7d), idempotency-record retention (≥24h).
A1.3 — Recovery from incidentsreplay.md §Retention and garbage collection; storage-adapters.md §Stale-claim recoveryAuditor inspects: restart-during-run.test.ts, staleClaim.test.ts, replay-fork.test.ts.

GDPR (EU 2016/679)

ArticleProtocol surfaceInspection target
Art. 5(1)(c) — Data minimizationagent-memory.md §SR-1 redaction; debug-bundle.md §Redaction guaranteesAuditor inspects: memory entries surface as [REDACTED:<id>] for BYOK plaintext; debug-bundle export excludes raw secrets per the redaction harness.
Art. 5(1)(e) — Storage limitationreplay.md §Retention; production-profile.md §Event retentionAuditor inspects: retention-window advertisement (capabilities.production.retention.minWindowSeconds), expired-run 410/404 envelope.
Art. 5(2) — Accountabilityauth-profiles.md §openwop-audit-log-integrityAuditor inspects: append-only audit log + hash chain + signed checkpoints; /v1/audit/verify makes the log inspectable by data-protection officers.
Art. 17 — Right to erasurereplay.md §Privacy rules for replaying cached LLM responsesAuditor inspects: deletion semantics across the run + event log + cached provider responses. Protocol does NOT mandate erasure UX — operators expose erasure to data subjects through host-specific tooling.
Art. 25 — Data protection by designSECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md; SECURITY/threat-model-prompt-injection.mdAuditor inspects: threat models published as part of the protocol; conformance scenarios that exercise the documented invariants.
Art. 30 — Records of processingobservability.md §Trace context propagation; canonical openwop.tenant_id / openwop.scope_id span attributesAuditor inspects: every run carries tenant + scope identifiers; OTel propagation makes downstream processing traceable.
Art. 32 — Security of processingauth.md §Bearer tokens; auth-profiles.md §OAuth2-CC / OIDC / mTLS; webhooks.md §HMACAuditor inspects: advertised auth profiles + the host's actual implementation per INTEROP-MATRIX.md.
Art. 33 — Personal data breach notificationSECURITY.md §Coordinated disclosureAuditor inspects: protocol-level disclosure SLA; operator wraps with deployment-specific notification process.
Art. 44–49 — Cross-border transfersauth.md §Tenant isolation; host-deployment surface (out of protocol scope)Auditor inspects: tenant scoping primitives; cross-border posture is deployment-level, not protocol-level.

HIPAA Security Rule (45 CFR Part 164)

SafeguardProtocol surfaceInspection target
§164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) — Information system activity reviewauth-profiles.md §openwop-audit-log-integrityAuditor inspects: audit log + verify endpoint; chain-validity proof.
§164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) — Authorization and supervisionauth.md §Scopes; auth-profiles.md §openwop-auth-api-key-rotationAuditor inspects: scope vocabulary + rotation grace-window advertisement.
§164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) — Login monitoringobservability.md §Trace context; per-request traceparentAuditor inspects: login attempts traceable via host-side audit-log entries (host-specific implementation; protocol surfaces the trace primitive).
§164.310(b) — Workstation useOut of protocol scope — deployment concernn/a
§164.312(a)(1) — Access controlauth.md §Bearer tokens + scopesAuditor inspects: authorization gating on every protected route.
§164.312(b) — Audit controlsauth-profiles.md §openwop-audit-log-integrityAuditor inspects: append-only audit storage, hash chain, signed checkpoints, verification endpoint.
§164.312(c)(1) — IntegritySame as §164.312(b)Same as above.
§164.312(d) — Person or entity authenticationauth-profiles.md §openwop-auth-oidc-user-bearerAuditor inspects: end-user OIDC bearer when host claims the profile.
§164.312(e)(1) — Transmission securityauth-profiles.md §openwop-auth-mtls; deployment TLS (out of protocol scope)Auditor inspects: mTLS advertisement + deployment TLS posture (front-end terminator).

Note on PHI (Protected Health Information): The protocol does not define a "PHI" data class. Operators that route PHI through openwop SHOULD use the [REDACTED:<id>] pattern in agent-memory.md §SR-1 to keep PHI out of observable channels, plus deployment-specific encryption-at-rest controls.


ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A

Control familyProtocol surfaceInspection target
A.5.1 — Policies for information securityThis document + SECURITY.md + threat modelsAuditor inspects: published threat models, disclosure policy.
A.5.7 — Threat intelligenceSECURITY/threat-model-*.md (5 published models)Auditor inspects: documented adversary classes + invariants.
A.5.15 — Access controlauth.md §ScopesAuditor inspects: route-to-scope mapping.
A.8.2 — Privileged access rightsauth-profiles.md §openwop-auth-api-key-rotationAuditor inspects: dual-key rotation grace window.
A.8.3 — Information access restrictionauth.md §Tenant isolation; CTI-1 cross-tenant invariantAuditor inspects: cross-tenant probe scenario.
A.8.6 — Capacity managementproduction-profile.md §BackpressureAuditor inspects: inflightCap advertisement + saturation envelope.
A.8.7 — Protection against malwarenode-packs.md §Pack signing (Ed25519); SECURITY/threat-model-node-packs.mdAuditor inspects: pack signature verification + signing-key rotation policy.
A.8.10 — Information deletionreplay.md §Retention; production-profile.md §Event retentionAuditor inspects: retention-window advertisement + expired-run envelope.
A.8.11 — Data maskingagent-memory.md §SR-1; observability.md §RedactionAuditor inspects: redaction harness + canary leak detector.
A.8.15 — Loggingauth-profiles.md §openwop-audit-log-integrity; observability.mdAuditor inspects: hash-chained audit log + OTel span/metric vocabulary.
A.8.16 — Monitoring activitiesobservability.md §Spans + metricsAuditor inspects: OTel emission scenarios.
A.8.24 — Use of cryptographywebhooks.md §HMAC signing; node-packs.md §Ed25519; auth-profiles.md §audit-log integrity (Ed25519 checkpoints)Auditor inspects: documented algorithms (HMAC-SHA-256 webhooks, Ed25519 signatures) — all are standard and FIPS-acceptable.

Compliance-relevant protocol primitives

The following surfaces are most often cited in compliance reviews. They are normative parts of the openwop spec; this doc is the cross-reference.

  • Authentication / authorization. auth.md, auth-profiles.md.
  • Audit log + integrity verification. auth-profiles.md §openwop-audit-log-integrity, /v1/audit/verify.
  • Secret redaction. SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §SR-1, agent-memory.md, observability.md §Redaction.
  • Tenant isolation. auth.md §Tenant isolation, agent-memory.md §CTI-1.
  • Retention + expiry. production-profile.md §Event retention, replay.md §Retention and garbage collection.
  • Encryption-in-transit. auth-profiles.md §openwop-auth-mtls for client→host; webhooks use TLS to subscriber endpoints per webhooks.md.
  • Encryption-at-rest. Out of protocol scope — deployment concern. Operators wire to KMS / database TDE / object-store SSE.
  • Observability + traceability. observability.md (W3C Trace Context + openwop.* OTel namespace).
  • Provenance. auth-profiles.md §openwop-audit-log-integrity audit log records actor + action + target.

How to use this document

1. Pick a compliance framework (SOC 2, GDPR, HIPAA, ISO 27001) that applies to your deployment. 2. Identify the controls your auditor cares about — your compliance team can produce this list. 3. Cross-reference here to find which protocol surface each control inspects. 4. Verify the host you're using actually implements that surface by consulting INTEROP-MATRIX.md — claim ≠ conformance evidence; the matrix records what each host has actually demonstrated. 5. Layer the deployment-specific controls (key management, employee access, data residency) that the protocol cannot provide.

If a compliance control you need isn't reflected here, file an issue. The intent is that this document grows with every new compliance framework that openwop deployments encounter.


See also

  • auth.md — bearer-token authentication and scope vocabulary
  • auth-profiles.md — optional production-auth profiles (rotation, OAuth2-CC, OIDC, mTLS, audit-log integrity)
  • agent-memory.md — memory layer + SR-1 secret redaction + CTI-1 cross-tenant isolation
  • production-profile.md — public-release operational profile (durability, backpressure, retention)
  • replay.md §Retention and garbage collection — replay history retention semantics
  • observability.mdopenwop.* OTel namespace, W3C Trace Context propagation
  • SECURITY.md — coordinated disclosure process
  • SECURITY/threat-model-*.md — five published threat models (auth, packs, prompt-injection, provider-policy, secret-leakage)
  • INTEROP-MATRIX.md — per-host conformance evidence